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ABSTRACT  
The Black Sea region, an area which for centuries has been fought over by various powers 
seeking to control its waterways and resources, has once again become the site of heightened 
geopolitical tensions, most notably between United States and other state actors including Russia 
and China. On the periphery of this strategic showdown is Romania, a former Iron Curtain state 
whose break from communism in 1989 has allowed for greater integration with the West. As a 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 2004, Romania has played a 
pivotal role in safeguarding Black Sea security and advancing both the alliance and the United 
States’ interests in the region. With the conclusion of the Trump presidency this past January, this 
thesis considers the Trump administration’s influence on the United States’ military, economic, 
and political ties with Romania, whether bilaterally or through multilateral bodies such as NATO. 
Furthermore, it evaluates how such policies were crafted by administration officials as part of a 
broader national security agenda meant to strategically position the United States relative to its 
adversaries in Beijing and Moscow. As Russia continues its efforts to expand its regional 
hegemony throughout the Black Sea and China increases its economic activity within Romania, 
what measures has the Trump administration undertaken to advance U.S. relations with Romania 
while securing stability in the Black Sea region?
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With the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump on January 20th, 2017, the new 
commander-in-chief brought with him a foreign policy perspective which sought to put 
“America First.”1 The prospect of the United States’ retreating from its partnerships around the 
world was especially worrisome for Black Sea littoral states like Romania. Now, as the Biden 
administration takes up the mantle of American leadership, this thesis will evaluate the impact 
that Trump’s four years had on U.S.–Romania relations, especially through both states’ 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The inquiry argues that the 
Trump administration advanced U.S. relations with Romania by expanding its economic position 
in the region while strengthening its defense posture amidst great power competition within the 
Black Sea. This combination of political, economic, and military strategies into one objective – 
in this instance deterring actors like Russia and China - harkens back to the “flexible response” 
doctrine of the early 1960s, a strategy which U.S. administrations followed in an effort to 
challenge Soviet influence around the world.   
I. Research Question 
Throughout Trump’s four years in office, his administration has faced numerous concerning 
developments in the Black Sea region, many of which have been spurred on by Moscow: 
escalating the separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, deliberately stoking political turmoil in Kiev, 
developing the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), encroaching upon Ukraine’s territoriality in the Kerch 
Strait and the Crimean Peninsula, and harassing U.S. naval ships on patrol nearby. Romania is a 
state that is most directly affected by such developments and looks to the United States for 
leadership in the region. Bucharest plays a critical role in ensuring the security and stability of 
                                                          
1 Trump, Donald. Inaugural Presidential Address. Project Gutenberg.  
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Europe’s southeastern flank against Russian aggression while also contributing to regional 
development in sectors such as energy. Brussels and Washington have a clear interest in 
sustaining their ties with Romania as a strategic counterweight to other actors’ agendas within 
the region. In this context, how has the Trump administration influenced U.S. relations with 
Romania, especially with the President’s calls for increased burden-sharing among NATO 
members, Russia’s belligerent actions in the Black Sea, and the entry of China into the regional 
market? Was the President himself primarily involved in crafting America’s political, military, 
and economic relations with Romania during his administration, or were officials throughout the 
vast government bureaucracy responsible? As analysts debate the legacy of Trump’s foreign 
policy now that his term has ended, the need to examine Trump’s influence on America’s ties 
with a crucial ally have never been greater. 
II. Research Design  
My method of investigation was a qualitative approach using comparative historical analysis 
and multimedia document inquiry. Research items included records from both government and 
non-governmental sources, academic publications, scholarly journals, newspaper articles, and 
films. The goal of such research was to contextualize relations between the United States and 
Romania before the Trump presidency and during his administration, especially in the context of 
contemporary security and geostrategic issues throughout the Black Sea region. Historical 
analysis includes a timeline of U.S.-Romania relations following the overthrow of the Ceaușescu 
regime in 1989 to before Trump took office in 2017. Romania’s efforts to integrate with the 
West by receiving membership in organizations like NATO and the European Union (EU) are 
considered, as is the growth of American engagement in Romania and the Black Sea region. 
Such a historical backdrop provides a well-rounded perspective from which to best evaluate 
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Trump’s influence on U.S. relations with Romania. The conclusion features expectations as to 
how President Joe Biden will (or will not) build upon the Trump administration’s work in 
furthering U.S. relations with Romania and strengthening America’s positioning vis-à-vis its 
rivals China and Russia. 
III. Literature Review 
Studies of U.S. relations with Romania under Trump have typically occurred within the 
broader context of America’s ties with NATO, especially with political commentators and policy 
analysts’ focus on the administration’s “America First” foreign policy doctrine. This camp 
attempts to understand the effect that the state of affairs between Washington and Brussels 
during the Trump presidency has had on allies like Romania in the face of various threats around 
the globe.2 Rather than concentrate specifically on bilateral ties with Romania, some scholars 
believe that such a “macro” analysis through NATO is sufficient in understanding how 
America’s partnerships in Europe have fared over the past four years. Prior to Trump, this 
approach was used by scholars throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a period during which the 
impetus between Washington and Bucharest’s relations was Romania’s entry into the alliance. 
Upon Romania’s admission in 2004 and Bucharest’s subsequent involvement in the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT), the “NATO approach” continued to be favored as America’s defense 
commitments in the Black Sea region increased.3 With the Trump administration’s calls for 
increased burden-sharing and threats to deprioritize the United States’ leadership role within the 
                                                          
2 Applebaum, Anne. "'America First' Has NATO Feeling Uneasy." The Washington Post (Washington, D.C), 2019. 
3 "Official Stresses Progress in Romania, US, NATO Cooperation in Missile Defence." BBC Monitoring European 
(London), 2013. 
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pact, academics have measured U.S-Romania ties as a consequence of deteriorating U.S.-NATO 
relations since 2017.4  
Other scholars and officials within the United States government (USG) believe that the 
Trump administration’s impact on U.S. relations with Romania was primarily in the commercial 
sector. Citing President Trump’s background as a businessman, they note the administration’s 
promotion of U.S. trade in goods and services with Romania as well as joint ventures in 
industries from energy to telecommunications.5 This perspective views Trump’s influence on 
bilateral ties with Romania through economic affairs, as U.S. corporations have increasingly 
sought a foothold in the Romanian market ever since Bucharest joined the EU in 2007.6 Due to 
the poor standards of Romania’s infrastructure and the ramifications of such a decrepit system on 
NATO’s military mobility on its eastern flank, analysts have also linked economic development 
to regional deterrence against Russian security threats.7 Considering the vast reserves of natural 
gas and offshore-oil in the Black Sea and Moscow’s attempts to increase Eastern Europe’s 
dependence on Russian energy resources, the Trump administration’s desire to advance U.S. 
energy interests as part of its economic policy with Bucharest has also been regarded as the 
primary driver of U.S. relations with Romania.  
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent aggression in eastern Ukraine shook the 
West, contributing to a cooling of U.S. relations with Moscow. Throughout the 2016 presidential 
campaign and within the first months in office, Trump’s statements calling for friendlier ties with 
                                                          
4 Tharoor, Ishaan. "Trump's NATO Trip Shows 'America First' Is 'America Alone'." Washingtonpost.com, 2018. 
5 "United States: President Donald J. Trump Is Celebrating Our Strong Partnership with Romania." TendersInfo 
News, 2019. 
6 Zamfir, Paul Bogdan. "Some Reflections on European Valences of Romania’s Trade in Goods with U.S." Analele 
Universităţii Constantin Brâncuşi Din Târgu Jiu : Seria Economie 1, no. Special Issue ECO-TREND (2016): 229-
33. 
7 Bugajski, Janusz, et al. “One Flank, One Threat, One Presence.” Center for European Budgetary Analysis, 22 Aug. 
2020, www.cepa.org/one-flank-one-threat-one-presence/.  
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Russia and personal praises for Vladimir Putin put America’s allies throughout Europe on 
guard.8 Uncertain over the new administration’s erratic attempts to launch a dialogue with the 
Kremlin, Central and Eastern European (CEE) states especially had cause for concern.9 Similar 
to how the U.S-NATO “macro” approach helped analysts evaluate the state of relations with 
CEE nations like Romania, scholars have used the U.S.-Russia framework to do the same. 
Analyzing U.S. relations with Romania as an extension of the Trump administration’s ties with 
Russia became more comprehensive as Russia continued its destabilizing actions in the Black 
Sea including developing the BSF and infringing upon Ukraine’s territory.  
Regardless of the framework, a deep understanding of U.S. foreign policy toward Romania 
prior to Trump as well as Bucharest’s relationship with NATO both before and after becoming a 
member is necessary. This will further analysis of the Trump administration’s actions by 
observing whether the 45th President continued policies set by previous administrations in 
developing stronger ties with Romania or took a different route.   
IV. Trend of U.S. – Romania Relations and U.S. Leadership in the 
Black Sea Region 
As a nation located on Europe’s southeast and situated at the crossroads between East and 
West, Romania has consistently played an important, strategic role in Black Sea affairs. Ever 
since Romania’s violent break from communism over 31 years ago, the Balkan state has sought 
to anchor itself in the West in the hopes of increased external security and prosperity.10 From the 
                                                          
8 "My Brilliant Friend; Trump and Putin." The Economist (London) 421, no. 9013 (2016): 24. 
9 Rutland, Peter. "Trump, Putin, and the Future of US-Russian Relations." Slavic Review 76, no. S1 (2017): S41-56. 
10 "The United States and Romania: Investing in Peace and Prosperity." U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 52 
(1993): 884. 
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immediate aftermath of the December 1989 revolution, the United States has worked with 
Bucharest to ensure progress in implementing the latter’s political and economic reforms while 
advocating for Bucharest’s commitment to values such as the rule of law, human rights, and 
democracy. The process of ensuring adherence to such principle would prove important in 
Romania’s process of receiving membership in NATO and the EU (achieved in 2004 and 2007 
respectively). Recognizing the advantages of robust relations with Romania post-1989, each U.S. 
administration has sought to further ties between Romania and the United States: George H.W. 
Bush and the launch of Bucharest’s bid for NATO membership, Bill Clinton and the Romania-
U.S. Strategic Partnership, George W. Bush and Romania’s induction as a NATO member, and 
Barack Obama and the launching of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). The 
strengthening of ties between Washington and Bucharest over the years has fostered a 
mutualistic relationship between both parties, proving that American leadership in the Black Sea 
region has an impact in ensuring transatlantic security.11 Such a development has proven 
especially prudent considering the deteriorating security landscape in the Black Sea amidst great 
power competition between the United States, Russia, and China.  
With the August 2020 announcement that 5,600 U.S. troops will be rotated from Germany to 
Romania and Bulgaria, many believe that a strategic showdown between Russia and the West the 
likes of which has not been witnessed since the Cold War may be brewing12. As Russia 
continues to violate Ukraine’s sovereign territoriality by encroaching through the Kerch Strait 
and undertaking hybrid warfare in the Donbas, the redeployment intends to buttress U.S. 
deterrence in the region. In the aftermath of Moscow’s 2014 seizure of Crimea, NATO 
                                                          
11 Penkov, M.Y. "The Military and Political Influence of the United States and Western Europe in the Eastern 
European Region." RUDN Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (2017): 230-38. 
12 Bertuca, Tony. "Esper: Some U.S. Troops Withdrawn from Germany Could Go to Romania." Inside the Pentagon 
36, no. 33 (2020): Inside the Pentagon, 2020-08-13, Vol.36 (33). 
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responded by deploying several battalions to member states along the Baltic and Black Seas as 
part of strengthening the alliance’s posture in countering Russian actions. A Readiness Action 
Plan (RAP), which detailed Brussels’ specific reforms to bolster defensive measures on its 
eastern flank, was also subsequently released, further proving the United States and NATO’s 
commitment to upholding the security of CEE states like Romania in the face of the Kremlin’s 
aggression.13 
V. Russian Resolve and Other State Actors 
The Black Sea region is host to a number of states, each vying for influence and control over 
the area’s resources and strategic positioning. Chief among such nations historically is Turkey 
and Russia, the latter of which has traditionally regarded the Black Sea as a “Russian lake.”14 
The competition between these two powers over the region has often led to major conflicts in the 
past, most notably the Crimean War of 1856 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Although 
Turkey is recognized as the ruling body over the Black Sea waterways per the 1936 Montreux 
Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, Russia has sought to increase its hegemony 
throughout the region.15 Under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation has undertaken 
a bold strategy of testing the West in an effort to understand just how far Moscow can go in 
provoking states on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank.16 As a member of both bodies, Romania 
has found itself the target of misinformation campaigns, belligerent military tactics such as razor-
thin passes by Russian jets near Romanian and American vessels, and public attacks from the 
                                                          
13 "NATO Foreign Ministers Move Forward with Readiness Action Plan." UPI NewsTrack, 2014. 
14 Coffey, Luke, and Kochis, Daniel. "NATO in the 21st Century: Preparing the Alliance for the Challenges of 
Today and Tomorrow." Policy File, 2020, Policy File, 2020-08-10. 
15 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 173, pp. 214–241. 
16 "Asymmetric Wars; Russia, Ukraine and Crimea." The Economist (London) 410, no. 8878 (2014): 14. 
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Kremlin through propaganda campaigns. However, Russia is not the only actor interested in 
carving out a stake in the Black Sea’s strategic potential. In what historically has been an 
exclusive playing field for Turkey, Great Britain, and Russia to joust for influence (with the 
United States’ joining after World War II), the Black Sea region has become the focus of rising 
state actors like China. 
Implementing economic development programs such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
the Chinese government has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in technology and 
infrastructure ventures within countries around the world17. The projects are often public-private 
partnerships agreed upon beforehand by Beijing through its state-owned corporations and the 
foreign government, and in the case of Romania, the ambition has been the spread of 5G 
technology and nuclear energy usage. Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company, has 
partnered with CEE states to develop their 5G data networks, yet the Trump administration 
harbored concerns that such business deals would encourage Huawei’s practice of espionage for 
Beijing.18 China has undertaken a similar approach in promoting civil nuclear usage as Chinese 
companies negotiate with Eastern European governments including Romania over the 
construction and operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Such ventures have also been criticized 
by the Trump administration, resulting in a push-and-pull between the USG and its European 
allies over China’s involvement in their economic affairs.19 Thus, Romania’s accessible markets 
                                                          
17 Huang, Yiping. "Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, Framework and Assessment." China 
Economic Review 40 (2016): 314-21. 
18 "Romania Considers Keeping Huawei Out From Its 5G Network." Radio Free Europe Documents and 
Publications, 2019, Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications, 2019-08-21. 
19 Zhang, Biao. "State Transformation Goes Nuclear: Chinese National Nuclear Companies' Expansion into 
Europe." Third World Quarterly 40, no. 8 (2019): 1459-478. 
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and investment environment draw the attention of actors as far away as Beijing, further 
complicating the geopolitical and strategic landscape in the Black Sea.  
VI. The Doctrine of “Flexible Response” 
General Maxwell D. Taylor, writing his 1959 work The Uncertain Trumpet, stated that “The 
National Military Program of Flexible Response should contain at the outset an unqualified 
renunciation of reliance on the strategy of Massive Retaliation. It should be made clear that the 
United States will prepare itself to respond anywhere, anytime, with weapons and forces 
appropriate to the situation.”20 In criticizing “Massive Retaliation,” Taylor was referring to the 
United States’ predominant national security strategy under President Dwight Eisenhower 
throughout the 1950s. The theory held that the United States will meet any Soviet or communist 
provocation by annihilating the opposing side with nuclear weapons. Faced with the prospect of 
thermonuclear war as well as American superiority in both air and nuclear power, the enemy 
would be deterred from further action. The approach was part of Eisenhower’s “New Look” 
policy, which prioritized nuclear capabilities over conventional means of warfare and aimed to 
restore fiscal responsibility in military spending as a result. When Cold War tensions escalated 
later in the decade as Soviet-funded insurgencies spread their message of national liberation from 
Cuba to Vietnam, Taylor envisioned a different strategy for strengthening U.S. security: one that 
can be tailored to a number of crises around the globe and provide various courses for action, 
each varying in scope and impact. Out of this conviction came the doctrine of flexible response.  
Others heard Taylor’s call for a new doctrine and concurred, among them Senator John F. 
Kennedy of Massachusetts, who at the time was campaigning for the 1960 Democratic 
                                                          
20 Taylor, Maxwell D. Essay. In The Uncertain Trumpet, 145–46. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974. 
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presidential nomination. Kennedy saw Massive Retaliation as a bluff that the Soviets called each 
time whenever tenuous confrontations arose throughout the world: the 1954 Taiwan Straits 
Crises, the 1956 the Hungarian Revolution and Suez Crisis, and the 1959 Cuban Revolution. 
Because Washington’s threats of nuclear annihilation were not credible, the Soviets and their 
communist allies could expand their influence around the world and provoke the West. Decision-
makers and officials in the Pentagon eventually relented against using overwhelming nuclear 
force, concerned about the loss of millions of innocent lives. Kennedy’s message also resonated 
with voters, many of whom were concerned about Moscow’s successes in the Third World. 
Kennedy ultimately won the 1960 election and immediately tasked his advisors to produce a 
security strategy based off of Taylor’s flexible response doctrine (Kennedy later appointed 
Taylor Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1962). The 35th President articulated this 
new vision in a speech before Congress on March 28th, 1961, claiming that… 
Our military posture must be sufficiently flexible and under control to be consistent with our 
efforts to explore all possibilities and to take every step to lessen tensions, to obtain peaceful 
solutions and to secure arms limitations. Diplomacy and defense are no longer distinct 
alternatives, one to be used where the other fails--both must complement each other.21 
 Under Kennedy, the objective of moving away from Massive Retaliation toward other 
options encompassed both military and nonmilitary means. In the military domain, the doctrine 
rested on three major departures from traditional U.S. foreign policy thinking at the time – large-
scale rebuilding of conventional and nonnuclear forces, refinement of nuclear options, and 
development of covert-action capabilities.22 The rationale behind the decisions was that the U.S. 
Army was outnumbered by the sheer size of Moscow’s ground forces and the Cold War playing 
                                                          
21 John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/236195.  
22 "Flexible Response: Was Kennedy’s Policy of Flexible Response Preferable to Eisenhower’s Doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation?" History in Dispute 1 (2000): 115-22. 
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field had broadened from Europe to the developing world. The United States maintained a 
seventeen-to-one advantage in intercontinental nuclear forces in 1961.23 Along with restoring 
America’s conventional capabilities, Kennedy favored investment in special operations 
squadrons. As a result, commando units such as the Green Berets were formed. Other concepts 
within the reshaping of American security policy included the “city-avoidance doctrine,” which 
U.S. Secretary of State (SecState) Robert McNamara introduced during a 1962 speech at the 
University of Michigan. Since flexible response increased the proportionality of U.S. actions in 
making them more appropriate to various situations, it maintained that innocent lives should be 
spared and therefore cities must be avoided as targets.24 Nonmilitary aspects included 
incorporating a combination of political, diplomatic, and economic strategies as a way for the 
USG to counter Soviet influence around the world. Such combinations were formally titled 
“Flexible Deterrent Options” and included policies such as strengthening military cooperation 
with potential allies, increasing or canceling American aid to other countries, and releasing 
public policy statements, among others.  
 The Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 put the flexible response 
doctrine to the test. In both instances, Kennedy and his advisors considered various responses to 
the developments occurring on the ground, such as a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets over 
the erection of the Berlin Wall or a bombing and invasion of Cuba. In each case, the 
administration demonstrated resolve and “peace through strength” while also allowing time for 
negotiations and diplomatic initiatives to run their course. Although flexible response was unable 
to prevent the Kennedy and Johnson administrations from falling into a quagmire in Vietnam, 
                                                          
23 Benkowski, James E. "Old Problems in New Posture Reviews? The Lessons of Flexible Response for Today." The 
SAIS Review of International Affairs 39, no. 2 (2019): 65-81. 
24 McNamara, Robert S, and James G Blight. Robert S. McNamara papers. Manuscript/Mixed Material. 
https://lccn.loc.gov/mm96083793.  
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allies like NATO adopted the strategy later in the 1960s as a way of ensuring readiness within 
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I. Introduction  
During a Fourth of July ceremony in Bucharest last year, U.S. Ambassador to Romania 
Adrian Zuckerman remarked, “I have said it many times before: the people of Romania have no 
better friend than the United States, and the United States has no better friend than Romania.”25 
Zuckerman, a Romanian émigré to the U.S. nominated by Trump in July 2018, conveyed a 
message which Washington had consistently delivered to the Romanian people since 1989: the 
United States proudly supports a prosperous, stable, and free future for Romania. Upon the 
overthrow of the Ceaușescu regime in December 1989, the United States was cautious to 
embrace Bucharest too quickly – former Communist apparatchiks held the reins to political 
power, the economy was in shambles with no prospect for market-oriented reform, and the 
military was in a state of disrepair. From President George H.W. Bush’s push for Bucharest’s 
adherence to principles like human rights to President Barack Obama’s initiative to host a missile 
defense site on Romanian soil, U.S.-Romanian relations have undergone a stark transformation 
from initial skepticism to full-hearted embrace. Romania altered itself in Washington’s eyes 
from a Warsaw Pact enemy to a NATO ally and from an international pariah to a respected 
partner. Over the past 31 years, as the strategic landscape across the globe and within the Black 
Sea region has shifted, Washington and Bucharest have adapted their objectives to cooperate in 
fulfilling their mutual political, military, and economic objectives. While Romania has matured 
from a security-dependent to a security-provider in the Black Sea, the United States has 
supported its ambitions to integrate with the West in joining bodies like NATO and the EU. 
Bilateral ties have also been elevated to new heights, as initiatives like the 1997 Strategic 
                                                          
25 “Ambassador Adrian Zuckerman at the Independence Day Event.” U.S. Embassy in Romania. U.S. Department of 
State, January 21, 2021. https://ro.usembassy.gov/ambassador-adrian-zuckerman-at-the-independence-day-
celebration-2020/.   
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Partnership and treaties like the 2011 Missile Defense Agreement have demonstrated both states’ 
commitment to furthering common goals in advancing national security and regional stability. 
Before evaluating the Trump administration’s impact on U.S. relations with Romania, it is 
critical to analyze its predecessors’ record in developing ties with Bucharest.   
II. George H.W. Bush: Bringing Romania to the World 
Several days after the Ceaușescus’ execution and the arrival of the National Salvation Front 
(FSN) to power under the leadership of President Ion Iliescu, President George H.W. Bush spoke 
with reporters on the dire situation in Romania. Noting how he was “just amazed and respectful 
of that change that has taken place,” Bush stressed his concern for “tranquility and freedom in 
Romania.”26 White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater followed the President’s remarks 
with an announcement that the United States will send $500,000 in humanitarian relief efforts to 
Romania and expressed the administration’s hope that the new government under Iliescu would 
“move quickly to implement democratic reforms based on the rule of law.”27 Having witnessed a 
wave of revolutions topple communist regimes across the Eastern Bloc throughout 1989, the 
Bush administration continued its policy of avoiding antagonizing Moscow by exploiting the 
crises in the CEE states. Although the focus initially was on efforts to stabilize the political 
situation in Bucharest, the USG under Bush became the first administration to guide Romania in 
its transition from its communist past toward Western-oriented internal reform. Despite the elder 
Bush’s single term in office, the United States did much to support Bucharest’s transformation 
                                                          
26 James Gerstenzang. "Upheaval in Romania U.S. Sending Medical Supplies to Romanians Foreign Aid: President 
Bush Says He `just Amazed' at the Change in Bucharest. He Hopes the New Government Will `move Quickly to 
Implement Democratic Reforms.'." The Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, Calif), 1989. 
27 Soble, Ronald L. "ROMANIA: DEATH OF A DICTATOR Washington Recognizes New Regime Foreign Policy: 
The White House Pledges Its Support but Criticizes the Quick Execution of Ceausescu and His Wife." The Los 
Angeles Times (Los Angeles, Calif), 1989.  
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from a pariah among the international community during the Ceaușescu years to a well-respected 
and engaged global actor. Such an endeavor was not without its lows in the years following the 
1989 revolution. Concerns about the FSN’s strong-arming of opposition political parties and 
their leaders, the Government of Romania’s (GOR) poor human rights track record, and its 
sluggish, centrally-planned economy were widespread within the Bush administration and 
Congress. Nevertheless, by the time Bush left office in 1993, U.S.-Romania relations were 
displaying signs of progress and cooperation on a number of fronts. 
Adopting a “wait-and-see” approach in the months following the revolution, the Bush 
administration intended to allow time for the internal political atmosphere to calm down while 
seeking not to provoke a response from the Kremlin. Bush recognized the Romanian Revolution 
as further evidence of the impending conclusion of the Cold War, providing him with additional 
fodder to convince Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev of a joint scaling-down of troop levels in 
both Eastern and Western Europe in 1990.28 Other than the broader context of the Cold War, the 
USG preferred to give Iliescu the benefit of the doubt. The Bush administration’s good faith in 
Iliescu continued throughout the first several months of the latter’s term as interim President, 
despite unease among Department of State (DOS) officials over his past actions as a Ceaușescu-
era apparatchik as well as those of other GOR officials, labeling them “old wine in new 
bottles.”29 SecState James Baker III’s visit to Bucharest on February 11, 1990 allowed him to 
convey to Iliescu the USG’s stance that progress on bilateral ties with the United States 
depended on his cabinet’s promotion of democratization and minority rights.30 Baker’s stark 
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reminder was followed by assurances of humanitarian aid and Washington’s support. A Foreign 
Affairs article articulated the Bush administration’s vision for Romania and other CEE states, 
claiming that the “Bush administration correctly calculated that the interest of the United States 
lay in allowing the authentic, peaceful democratic revolutions to run their course.”31 
Nevertheless, Bush’s goodwill soon ran out with the events of the following June. 
May 20th, 1990 saw Romania hold its first free elections since 1937, with Iliescu’s FSN 
receiving 85% of the total vote and securing large majorities in both the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate. Despite reports of organized violence by the FSN directed against supporters of 
opposition parties, the USG recognized the results as “free and fair.”32 Protests at University 
Square in Bucharest, largely held by students and faculty members of local institutions like the 
University of Bucharest, voiced demands that GOR officials with previous ties to the Romanian 
Communist Party (PCR) be barred from running for office. Attempts by police to forcibly 
remove anti-FSN protestors who had set up camps in the square were met with resistance. 
Subsequent talks with the protestors broke down, and by June 11 the demonstration moved to the 
government headquarters located at Victoria Square. Two days later, police and students clashed 
on the streets of Bucharest, resulting in hundreds of arrests and Iliescu’s call for order. Outside 
the Ministry of Interior, soldiers opened fire on demonstrators, killing five and wounding 
others.33 At the President’s invitation, thousands of coal miners from the Jiu Valley equipped 
with wooden clubs and makeshift weapons were bussed in along with factory workers across the 
country. The workers beat passers-by in University Square and other sections of the city, 
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targeting individuals who resembled academics, students, or the well-to-do. Miners ransacked 
opposition party headquarters as well as the offices of newspapers critical of Iliescu. Speculation 
abounded that the miners were abetted by the Romanian Army and former Securitate (Romanian 
secret police) members. International condemnation of Iliescu and the GOR was swift, with the 
USG publicly claiming that the violence “departs from the commonly accepted norms of 
democracy and the rule of law.” Bush’s office deemed the miners’ actions, known by Romanians 
as the Mineriad, “government-inspired vigilante justice.”34 Six months after a tumultuous 
revolution toppled a dictatorship, the June 1990 Mineriad was an abrupt sign that Romania had a 
long way to go on its path to Western integration.  
Although the White House suspended all non-humanitarian aid to Romania following the 
miners’ riot, the cooling period in relations was brief. As the Bush administration prepared to 
undertake an offensive against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein for the latter’s incursion into Kuwait, the 
USG sought to organize an international coalition for Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm. As one of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council at the time, Romania 
proved to be a dependable partner in advancing such efforts. Romania’s Ambassador to the UN, 
Aurel Dragos Munteanu, served as the Council’s Chairman and endorsed various UN resolutions 
condemning hostile Iraqi actions and imposing sanctions on Baghdad. Iliescu’s visit in October 
1990 to speak at the United Nations General Assembly also included a meeting with U.S. 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in an attempt to return to the Bush administration’s 
good side.35 The GOR’s adoption of a new Constitution in November 1991, one which codified 
Romania’s commitment to principles including political pluralism, freedom of speech, and 
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minority rights, partly assuaged Western concerns. Other attempts by the GOR to win favor with 
the Bush administration included Iliescu’s denouncing the attempted Soviet coup of Gorbachev 
in August 1991.36 By the time of the local elections of February 9th, 1992, the pressure was on 
for the GOR to showcase its progress in building its democracy. Under the watchful eye of 70 
international observers, the smooth election proceedings were recognized as a milestone for 
Romania’s journey toward Western integration. Following the success of the local elections, 
Romanian support for UN sanctions on neighboring Yugoslavia in late May 1992 also garnered 
Bucharest support from Western circles, despite the losses such a policy inflicted upon the 
Romanian economy. Throughout the high and low points of the FSN’s initial years in power, the 
Bush administration sought to ensure Romanian progress on achieving liberal standards from 
civil liberties to religious freedom. 
U.S. relations with Romania during the elder Bush’s administration featured an emphasis on 
economic affairs that was just as strong as on political matters. The main issue in that realm was 
U.S. reinstatement of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to Romania – a move that would help 
alleviate Bucharest’s post-1989 financial plight by removing U.S. barriers to trade like tariffs or 
high import quotas. Romania initially received MFN in 1975 as part of Washington’s rewarding 
Eastern Bloc countries like Romania for relaxing emigration restrictions for Jews and pursuing 
an “independent” foreign policy from its patrons in Moscow. Under the waiver for such policies, 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, Ceaușescu’s Romania joined Poland and 
Hungary as the only Iron Curtain states to obtain the special trading designation. However, after 
years of human rights abuses and political crackdowns under Ceaușescu soured Romania’s 
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standing in the international community, pressure mounted for Congress to revoke Romania’s 
MFN status by the mid-to-late 1980s. Ceaușescu pulled out first, announcing Romania’s 
unilateral withdrawal from the non-discriminatory trade policy on February 26th, 1988.37 Upon 
the Bush White House’s recognition of the new government in Bucharest and the 
reestablishment of diplomatic ties on January 9th, 1990, the Iliescu cabinet declared its objective 
to reobtain MFN status from Washington.38 The economic necessity of regaining MFN 
privileges was high, as from 1988 to 1989 American-Romanian trade decreased by over $400 
million worth of goods due to the loss of American export credits.39 A daunting task lay ahead: 
persuade a Bush Administration unconvinced that Iliescu was serious about enacting meaningful 
internal reform as well as a skeptical Congress to extend MFN to the GOR. 
The effort became more difficult throughout 1990, as internal events across Romania 
continued to portray it as regressing back to communist-era policies in Washington’s eyes. 
Interethnic clashes between Romanians and Hungarians in the city of Târgu Mureș in March, the 
political crisis following the May elections, and the fallout from the June Mineriad did not cast 
Romania in a good light. Throughout the following year, Capitol Hill continued to criticize 
Romania’s poor track record on a number of issues. Hearings by the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees on Romanian black-market 
adoption schemes as well as media coverage on rising anti-Semitism among Romanians led 
Congress to bypass Romania in its MFN deliberations that year.40 However, the Bush 
administration’s change in attitude toward Bucharest, coming after the GOR’s support for U.S. 
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initiatives on the Security Council and its stand against the Soviet coup, led to changes in 
bilateral economic ties. A congressional delegation under Congressman Sam Gibbons, Chairman 
of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade, visited Romania and noted progress on 
governmental reforms. Gibbons’ report relayed Bush’s three conditions for restoring MFN: free 
and fair elections in 1992, freedom of the press, and civilian control of the military. Other 
measures, such as Romanian commitments to intellectual property rights and greater U.S. access 
to internal markets, were left to be addressed by a future trade deal. Following the success of the 
February 1992 local elections, negotiations over a bilateral trade accord accelerated. The 
Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States and Romania was signed in Bucharest 
on April 3rd, 1992 and concerned matters ranging from increasing U.S. private sector 
involvement in Romanian commerce to Romania’s easing of import restrictions.41 Over a month 
later, a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) meant to protect against the nationalization of certain 
industries was signed by both parties on May 28th.42 Having secured Romania’s strategic support 
in implementing the UN embargo on Yugoslavia, Bush urged members of Congress to consider a 
resolution granting Romania MFN status. In a letter to congressional leaders on June 22nd, Bush 
urged Congress to approve the Agreement on Trade Relations after waiving the Jackson-Vanik 
restrictions for Romania, noting that… 
The Agreement will provide a non-discriminatory framework for our bilateral trade relations 
and thus strengthen both economic and political relations…Conclusion of this Agreement is 
an important step we can take to provide greater economic benefits to both countries. It will 
also give further impetus to the progress we have made in our overall diplomatic relations 
since last year and help to reinforce political and economic reform in Romania. In that 
context, the United States is encouraging Romania to continue to strive for a democratic, 
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pluralistic society, particularly through the conduct of early, free, and fair national 
elections.43  
 House Joint Resolution 512 extending MFN treatment to Romania was immediately 
drafted and approved for a floor vote on July 23rd. By then, most Congressmen sought to 
postpone the vote until after the Romanian presidential election on September 27th, which they 
saw as another key test for Romanian democracy. Although the election went smoothly 
according to reports from the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, an anti-Romanian lobbying effort led 
by Congressman Tom Lantos of California turned the tide against the GOR’s prospects for 
receiving MFN status at the time. Joint Resolution 512 was defeated by a vote of 283 against and 
88 for. Despite the initial failure to extend MFN treatment to the GOR in the first years of the 
Iliescu government, the Bush administration nevertheless made considerable gains in improving 
trade relations and investment ties between the two countries. 
 U.S. relations with Romania under George H.W. Bush featured attempts to stimulate 
reform in both political and economic sectors while simultaneously bringing Romania from its 
isolation among the international community. Despite taking a hands-off approach in the first 
months of the FSN’s coming to power, during which the world witnessed the violent anti-
government protests in Bucharest along with interethnic clashes in Transylvania, the Bush White 
House decided to take a more activist role later on in 1991 until the end of his term. Working 
together with Romania in international fora like the UN Security Council in addressing crises 
from Iraq to Yugoslavia, the United States helped Romania gain credibility on the global stage. 
With a weakened economy and a desire to regain MFN entitlements, the GOR began its 
campaign to convince Congress and the USG of a mutualistic trade relationship to receive the 
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trading privilege. Although Bucharest ran into some bumps along the way and ultimately did not 
secure MFN during Bush’s term, the United States and Romania signed a trade accord as well as 
an investment treaty from which both parties could expand bilateral economic ties. The mantle 
now passed to the incoming U.S. President, Bill Clinton, whose administration was responsible 
for elevating U.S. relations with Romania to new heights.  
III. Bill Clinton: Securing the Strategic Partnership 
During the Clinton presidency, U.S.–Romania relations reached unchartered territory. Most 
U.S. administrations since the Nixon era have devoted considerable attention to analyzing 
Bucharest’s potential for cooperation in the age of détente. However, with the Cold War’s 
conclusion and the willingness of former Iron Curtain states to pursue Western integration, the 
United States now had an opportunity to build a formidable relationship with a strategically 
important nation from scratch. The Clinton administration envisioned a mutualistic relationship 
featuring Washington’s continued support for Romanian membership in NATO and the EU 
while Bucharest allowed access to its markets. Eight years under Clinton saw feats in the United 
States’ bilateral ties with Romania including reissuing MFN status, establishing the U.S.-
Romania Strategic Partnership, and cooperating in matters from nuclear energy to law 
enforcement. As the November 1996 general election marked the first peaceful transfer of power 
since the fall of Communism, U.S. officials were able to find common ground with members of 
the GOR on matters ranging from economic assistance to progress on fulfilling NATO 
membership standards. Despite Washington’s position against inviting Romania to join NATO at 
the Madrid Summit in 1997 due to fears of Russian resentment and the U.S. Senate’s hesitance to 
admit more new members, Clinton was received by over 150,000 cheering Romanians on his 
visit to Bucharest following the NATO gathering. Noting how far Romanians had come since 
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their struggles under Ceaușescu and their continued support for a future in the West in his 
remarks, Clinton proclaimed that “the door to NATO is open. It will stay open. And we will help 
you to walk through it.”44 Following Bush’s term, which featured assisting Romania upon its 
entry into the “new world order,” Clinton’s statement perfectly symbolized Washington’s 
approach to bilateral relations with Romania at the time.  
Upon entering office, the Clinton administration sought to exhibit U.S. leadership in Eastern 
Europe by focusing on developing bilateral ties with CEE states including Romania. As for 
Iliescu and his government, the objective was the same as the one with the previous White House 
occupant: secure MFN status for Romania as a means to improve the country’s economic 
prospects while also bolstering its image in other Western countries. With the Yugoslav conflict 
escalating into a wider conflict with the potential to further destabilize Eastern Europe, Romania 
continued its enforcement of the UN Security Council’s embargo throughout 1993. In exchange 
for monitoring its Danube River boundary with Yugoslavia and blocking cross-border trade, the 
GOR received gunboats from Washington to assist its efforts in enforcing the sanctions. 
Meanwhile, several congressmen renewed calls for extending MFN status to Romania.45 U.S. 
diplomats, including then-U.S. Ambassador to Romania John Davis, praised the government for 
its willingness to uphold regional stability, observing that there were “very few infractions by the 
Romanians.”46 Iliescu, during a March 1993 visit in Washington to attend the opening of the 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, spoke with the President, Vice President Al Gore, and members 
of Congress on the progress Romania had made on human rights and economic reform. Iliescu 
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also met with officials from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as representatives 
from major U.S. multinational corporations such as Boeing to discuss potential business 
investment in Romania.   
With congressional support for granting MFN steadily growing after Iliescu’s visit, Clinton 
resubmitted to Congress the April 1992 trade agreement as well as a request for fast-track 
approval of MFN.47 Stating that the “conclusion of this Agreement is an important step we can 
take to provide greater economic benefits to both countries,”48 the President urged Congress to 
pass the legislation. After hearings by the House Subcommittee on Trade provided more 
evidence of support from business groups for reissuing the trade designation, Joint Resolution 
228 passed after a voice vote by the representatives. After an affirmative Senate vote, Clinton 
signed the bill on November 2nd and Romania officially regained its MFN status. In granting 
MFN to the GOR, the Clinton administration had placed Romania on equal footing with other 
CEE states in terms of U.S. trade treatment while also boosting the Romanian economy. New 
credit lines were opened, tariffs on Romanian products decreased precipitously, and Romanian 
exports jumped by 10% the following year.49  
Romania’s participation under MFN continued to be annually reviewed and renewed by 
Congress until August 3rd 1996, when Clinton signed H.R. 3161 into law. The legislation, which 
bestowed permanent MFN status to the GOR, was hailed by Clinton as an indicator that Romania 
“will continue its progress and intensify efforts to make democratic free market reforms, develop 
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good relations with its democratic neighbors, and reach out to Romania’s ethnic and religious 
minorities.”50  However, despite the restoration of exclusive trading privileges, Romania’s 
hostile business climate, antiquated tax system, and systemic corruption continued to discourage 
consistent investment from American companies. With Iliescu’s government lethargically 
reforming the economy, U.S. officials now faced the question of how best to develop Romania’s 
economic and political potential while furthering U.S. interests. Bucharest’s NATO bid provided 
an additional impetus for resolving such an issue. 
 While the United States publicly voiced its support for Romania’s push to join NATO, some 
within the Clinton administration were not as keen on the prospect of expanding the alliance 
eastward. The loudest protestations came from the Pentagon, where the top brass had not initially 
warmed to Romania’s membership bid, hailing Brussels’ Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative as 
the best way for Washington to engage with the militaries of CEE nations without extending 
membership instead. By January 1994, however, Clinton was convinced on the potential for the 
United States to lead the former Eastern Bloc countries to NATO membership and greater 
prosperity. Speaking at a news conference with CEE leaders in Prague, Clinton noted that “the 
question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how.”51 Such an 
encouraging message from the U.S. President gave hope to the GOR’s ambition to be admitted 
by the next NATO Summit in Madrid. However, despite approving signals from Washington, the 
harsh reality was that the reconversion of the Romanian economy away from state control under 
Iliescu was moving too slowly. While other CEE states such as Hungary and Poland undertook 
economic reform almost immediately in the early 1990s, hundreds of Romania’s public 
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enterprises had yet to be privatized by 1996. The average monthly wage in December 1996 
($135) was 70% of the wage in October 1990 terms.52 Ignoring previously agreed-upon budget 
ceilings with the IMF, the Iliescu government increased the fiscal deficit to 8.3% in 1996 by 
raising public sector wages and subsidies to state enterprises.53 As a result, inflation rose to 57%, 
double the rate two years before. To make matters worse, the Romanian lei depreciated by 30% 
while the government imposed tariffs on industries from railways to crude oil production.54 In 
the midst of such economic woes, attempts to concentrate resources and finances toward 
implementing NATO interoperability standards as well as other membership parameters proved 
difficult for the GOR. U.S. diplomats took notice of the dire situation for Romania’s NATO 
aspirations, as U.S. Ambassador Alfred H. Moses wrote at the time that… 
In spite of its efforts to meet NATO interoperability standards, Romania lacks the money to 
make the quantum leap to Western levels, a deficiency that will continue well into the next 
century. For example, Romania’s air force will continue to rely primarily on Israeli-upgraded 
MiG 21s and on older planes rapidly becoming obsolete…To upgrade its forces more 
rapidly, the Romanian economy will have to expand faster than expected. Until Romania 
demonstrates to the IMF and the World Bank that its economy is on a course of long-term 
sustainable growth, these two institutions, on whom Romania depends for credibility in 
external financial markets, will continue to impose strict limits on Romania’s military 
spending.55 
As the November 1996 general election loomed, the incumbent Iliescu and his Party of 
Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) continued to advocate for the status quo. Voters were 
offered the choice between Iliescu and the reform-minded opposition, the Romanian Democratic 
Convention (CDR), led by former geology professor Emil Constantinescu. The CDR ultimately 
prevailed in a landslide victory, and Constantinescu set about not only improving the state of the 
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economy but also ensuring that Romania put its best foot forward at NATO’s July 1997 Summit 
in Madrid. The pace of Romanian efforts to achieve NATO membership accelerated once the 
new center-right coalition took office.  
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, another campaign was enjoying the spoils of its electoral 
victory. During the 1996 presidential election, Clinton embraced NATO enlargement eastward as 
a strategy that would allow for the expansion of free markets and democracy to a region that had 
not enjoyed living under such systems. Following his blowout win and recognizing the short 
window until Madrid, Clinton and other administration officials now sought to convince 
Congress and public opinion on the merits of enlargement and its potential to foster a “united 
Europe.” SecState Madeline Albright, testifying at an April 1997 Senate Armed Services 
Committee hearing on the administration’s enlargement proposal, claimed that through the 
policy, “America will gain strong new partners in security and trade and we will gain confidence 
that our armed forces will not again be called upon to fight on European soil.”56 Another actor 
which needed convincing on the value of enlargement was Russia, whose government had 
repeatedly expressed its displeasure with the notion of NATO expansion to its borders. Both 
Brussels and Washington recognized the importance of a formal relationship between the 
alliance and Moscow in addressing such concerns, resulting in the signing of the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act in Paris on May 27th. The non-binding document was the administration’s attempt 
to take the sting out of the first wave of enlargement set to be approved by members in Madrid. 
In the meantime, Constantinescu attempted to rein in deficit spending by liquidating state-owned 
industries and signing agreements with the IMF to improve tax collection. The GOR, with 
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newfound momentum from the centrist coalition, simultaneously embarked on a campaign to 
prove to NATO member states Romania’s potential to become a reliable security partner. 
Bucharest’s hopes for inclusion in the first wave were dashed with President Clinton’s 
announcement on June 12th that the U.S. would only support the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary’s NATO bids at Madrid.57 Although the United States’ reluctance to admit Romania at 
Madrid proved hurtful to members of Romania’s political elite after U.S. assurances to the 
contrary, Romania’s candidacy attracted enough support from southern European member states 
such as Italy and France to merit a special mention and a promise from Clinton to review their 
membership application again in 1999.58 Pentagon studies on the armed forces of candidate 
countries portrayed Romania as “’moving in the right direction’ but at a ‘slower’ speed than 
countries like Poland and Hungary.”59 In light of the announcement, Secretary of Defense 
(SecDef) William Cohen remarked that “the United States did not say no to Romanian 
membership in NATO…It said, ‘Not yet.’”60 The GOR was left frustrated, leaving some to 
ponder whether “having heard the questions now asked in Washington about the need to admit a 
few countries into the Alliance, do we seriously believe that there will be an American president 
ready to argue Romania’s case in a few years from now?”61 As Air Force One landed in 
Bucharest on July 11th for Clinton’s state visit, those who questioned Romanians’ attitudes 
following Washington’s rejection of Romania’s bid at Madrid were in for a surprise.   
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 Speaking with President Constantinescu in front of thousands of cheering Romanians, 
Clinton acknowledged Romania’s prior suffering under communism and its future in a unified 
and democratic Europe. Pundits were astounded to witness the massive outpouring of support for 
the U.S. President, noting the public reactions to Clinton were more favorable than in Warsaw 
the day before (after Poland had just been invited).62  Undeterred by Brussels and Washington’s 
refusal to invite their country in the first wave of enlargement, Romanians listened as Clinton 
assured them that “if you stay the course and manifest the love of liberty we all see here today, 
there can be no stronger candidate.” Clinton also announced the launch of the U.S.-Romania 
Strategic Partnership, with which “Romania can show the people of this region…that there is a 
better way than fighting and division and repression.”63 Thus, Clinton’s visit marked a new 
chapter in post-Cold War relations between the United States and Romania: a partnership that 
demonstrated Washington’s commitment to Romania’s eventual immersion into the West as well 
as Bucharest’s willingness to further ties with the former in political, economic, and military 
affairs. 
Romania became the first country among CEE states to conclude a Strategic Partnership 
agreement with the U.S. Talks on the upgrading of bilateral ties had actually begun during visits 
to Washington by Foreign Minister Adrian Severin and Defense Minister Victor Babiuc three 
months prior to Clinton’s visit. Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea followed up on the ministers’ 
work during his visit in June, one month before the Madrid summit. A DOS fact sheet on the 
partnership noted that the Clinton administration “anticipate[s] the partnership, the exact form 
and scope of which remain to be worked out bilaterally, will involve exchanges of high-level 
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visits, expanded periodic consultations on security and foreign policy issues, and enhancements 
to existing economic and military assistance programs.”64 The Partnership began the work of 
creating a framework upon which matters ranging from Euro-Atlantic integration to regional 
security challenges can be addressed. The first high-level consultation on behalf of the 
Partnership was with Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Europe and Canada Marc Grossman 
on October 3rd, where the main areas of interest between both parties were established. 
Romanian General Mihail Ionescu noted at the time that… 
Cooperation with the United States will be the main objective of both Romanian foreign 
policy and security policy. Moreover, Romania must become one of the most powerful allies 
of the United States in Southeastern Europe. The presence of American interests in the 
country - economic interests above all - represents a strategic element for the modernization 
and development of Romanian society...The essence of the Strategic Partnership is 
essentially determined by the concentration and the coordination of strategic policies, 
initiatives, and actions and is realized through a set of common projects, which results from a 
mechanism of consultation (the Plan of Action). Political relations have been the most 
dynamic element in the Strategic Partnership. This is proven by the frequency and the level 
of visits by political leaders following the establishment of the Strategic Partnership 
(President Clinton’s visit to Bucharest, the Romanian president’s visit to the United States, 
eight meetings between the ministers of foreign affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State, and 
numerous other actions in the political-diplomatic field).”65 
 Other considerations for the Partnership included consolidating democracy and reform 
within Romania in preparation for integration into Western bodies. Working groups consisting of 
members from both nations’ armed forces were formed to facilitate the Romanians’ progress on 
military reform and exchanges as part of initiatives such as PfP. The focus on transforming the 
Romanian military to further its progress on NATO interoperability included the GOR’s 
acquisitions of weaponry, especially from US sources. Deals included Bucharest’s purchase of 
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96 Cobra helicopters from Bell-Textron for $1.5 billion as well as contracting Lockheed Martin 
for five dual-use surveillance radars and a new regional air control system.66 “Mil-to-Mil” visits 
by U.S. military officials included a November 1998 Pentagon delegation led by Major General 
Henry Kievenaar to evaluate the status of reforms as agreed upon through the military 
component of the Strategic Partnership. Romanian officers also received more opportunities to 
interact with their American counterparts through hands-on training activities. On the economic 
front, the Partnership provided Washington with the means to implement projects and 
investments proposed by U.S. multinational companies within Romania. 
Since the launch of the Partnership and throughout the remainder of the Clinton 
presidency, a flurry of bilateral agreements such as those on establishing a Center for Fighting 
Organized Crime and Corruption in Bucharest, against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, customs procedures, and cooperation in civil aviation were also signed.67 Other 
accords, such as those addressing the peaceful use of nuclear energy and on collaboration in the 
fields of science and technology were signed upon Constantinescu’s visit to the U.S. in July 
1998.68 During his time in Washington, Constantinescu became the first Eastern European leader 
to address Congress since the body ratified the first candidates for NATO enlargement.69 Noting 
that “the Romanian people consider the United States to be our most reliable partner,” the 
Romanian President went on to state that “democracy can only flourish in Romania and we can 
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only become a more positive influence in the region if our role as a stabilizing force is 
acknowledged and supported by the United States and its allies.”70 Constantinescu conveyed 
what U.S. lawmakers and the Clinton administration already knew: Romanians desired and were 
ready to take on the responsibilities associated with being a NATO member. A 1997 
EUROBAROMETER POLL showed that 76% of Romanians were in favor of joining NATO, 
the highest among Southeastern European nations.71 Romanians and members of the GOR 
recognized that while the Strategic Partnership did not serve as an alternative to achieving 
NATO membership, its creation and subsequent development in the latter years of the Clinton 
administration signified a critical development in U.S.-Romania relations going forward. 
 In an article for The Atlantic, journalist Robert Kaplan wrote that in poor Balkan 
countries like Romania, “NATO is seen as the ultimate totemic symbol of Western 
civilization.”72 Throughout the Clinton administration, the United States worked to ensure that 
Bucharest would progress along the path to becoming a member, even during initial misgivings 
on the ramifications of enlargement. Clinton perceived the crucial role America could play in 
helping establish democracy and capitalism in Romania, where related reforms were carried out 
reluctantly under Iliescu. In 1997, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and 
Agricultural Affairs Stuart Eizenstat observed that “in the Cold War the concept was 
containment; now it’s to enlarge the scope of democracy. It’s all about widening market 
access.”73 U.S. relations with Romania under Clinton sought to do just that and more: restore 
MFN privileges to spur trade, engage with the Romanian military in reforming its armed forces, 
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and recognize Romania’s potential to stabilize the Black Sea region with the establishment of the 
Strategic Partnership. Whereas George H.W. Bush’s term saw the US supervise the laying of 
Romania’s foundation as a state committed to human rights and democracy, Bill Clinton’s tenure 
saw the rapid acceleration of U.S. ties with Bucharest on a number of fronts through the 
Partnership. As the 42nd President left office in January 2001, his successor, George W. Bush, 
became the one who finally fulfilled the dreams of millions of Romanians since they freed 
themselves from Ceaușescu’s grip in 1989.   
IV. George W. Bush: Broadening Bucharest’s Horizons 
"September 11th transformed the Black Sea into a natural springboard," said Romanian 
Foreign Minister Mircea Geoană during a 2002 Washington Post interview.74 The terrorist 
attacks, which subsequently launched the GWOT and shifted the global strategic landscape, 
triggered Article V of NATO’s Washington Treaty (“an attack on one is an attack on all”). 
Among the various armed forces participating in Operating Enduring Freedom and the NATO-
led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were Romanian infantry contingents. 
Although Bucharest had not yet been granted admission into NATO, the GOR was determined to 
assist Washington not only as a de facto member of the alliance, but also as part of its Strategic 
Partnership. The Bush administration recognized such efforts and confidently advocated for 
Romania’s admission into NATO at the 2002 Prague Summit, where after 13 years in the 
wilderness Romania finally found a home in the West as a member of the alliance. As a strategic 
ally of the United States, Romania supported the GWOT by deploying its troops to fight in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and signing a bilateral Status of Forces agreement which provided for U.S. 
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access to military bases on Romanian soil. Extending NATO membership to Romania and other 
CEE states shifted the boundaries of the pact’s eastern flank. Likewise, the Black Sea was now 
viewed as a more critically strategic region into which Washington could invest capital and 
logistical support for achieving its geopolitical ends. As a newly-minted NATO member, 
Bucharest expanded its position as a security provider in the Black Sea by further engaging with 
the United States across political, military, and economic fronts. By the time President George 
W. Bush left office in 2009, Romania had hosted a NATO Summit and established its status as 
an active member of the alliance.  
The GWOT thrust Romania into the spotlight as a former Iron Curtain state which had only 
recently taken its unique relationship with the U.S. to a new tier with the launching of the 
Strategic Partnership several years earlier. While other NATO member states across Europe such 
as France and Germany pushed back on Bush administration policies such as advocating for 
preemptive strikes and invading Afghanistan, Bucharest offered itself as a dependable ally to 
Washington’s security objectives. Despite Iliescu’s return to office following the 2000 
presidential election, Romanian support for its bilateral ties with Washington remained strong. 
One of Bucharest’s first signs of goodwill with the Bush administration was to allow U.S. access 
to Romanian airspace and facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. These and other matters such 
as criminal jurisdiction for U.S. personnel were addressed in the bilateral Defense Status of 
Forces Agreement, which was signed by both parties in Washington on October 30th, 2001.75 
Having sent hundreds of infantry troops into the operation against the Taliban, Romania 
demonstrated its commitment to the military component of the GWOT. Bush administration 
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officials also took notice when Romania become the first country to sign an “Article 98” 
agreement with Washington, which exempted Americans from being tried by the International 
Criminal Court.76 The bilateral accord was signed in August 2002, several months before the all-
important NATO Summit in Prague, where the candidacies of CEE countries like Romania and 
other states would be reevaluated. The Bush administration, recognizing the political and 
military advantages of admitting such states, pushed hard for a “blanket” enlargement at the 
gathering. After member states agreed to admitting the candidate states that November, Bush 
was received by jubilant crowds in both Vilnius, Lithuania and Bucharest, where commentators 
noted the reception nearly dwarfed that of Clinton’s in 1997. Speaking at Piața Revoluției in 
Bucharest, President Bush affirmed that…  
NATO’s invitation to join was also a vote of confidence that you will continue the hard work 
of political, economic, and military reform. And as you do, you will have partners in all the 
nations of NATO. The promises of our alliance are sacred, and we will keep our pledges to 
all the nations that join us. Should any danger threaten Romania, the United States of 
America and NATO will be by your side. As s NATO Ally, you can have this confidence. No 
one will be able to take away the freedom of your country...NATO membership will make 
Romania more secure, and Romania will add to the strength of the NATO Alliance as we 
face unprecedented new dangers. Already, our troops are serving side by side in Afghanistan. 
Already, Romania has joined the global coalition against terror. And we thank you very 
much.77 
Although Bush was only on the ground in Romania for several hours, the seeds of a fruitful 
relationship that had been planted by his father over a decade ago had begun to sprout. Romania 
was now a member of the alliance, and its bilateral ties with Washington in the context of the 
GWOT meant more work was to be done. 
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The momentum from Romania’s admission into NATO and Bush’s visit to the capital 
allowed talks between Bucharest and Washington on furthering joint military ties to accelerate. 
The focus of such outreach was negotiations over a new Status of Forces Agreement – one that 
supported U.S. operations in the Middle East and beyond from Romanian sites such as Mihail 
Kogălniceanu (MK) Airbase and Badabag Training Area. Other facilities such as the Cincu 
Training Range allowed American troops to develop their skills and assist their Romanian 
counterparts in furthering progress on interoperability standards. Discussions around such an 
agreement began with the overhaul of U.S. troop deployments in August 2004, when the Bush 
administration withdrew 38,000 troops from U.S. bases in Germany (from a total of 62,000) and 
redeployed them to other countries. Recipient nations included new NATO member states like 
Bulgaria and Romania, demonstrating their strategic importance to U.S. national security goals 
in the region and in conflict areas throughout the Middle East. Romania appealed to U.S. military 
planners as a location that provided cost-saving measures, logistical support, and a welcoming 
local populace encouraged by American investment. Air Force General Charles Wald, deputy 
chief of U.S. European Command (EUCOM), noted at the time that Romania was one of the 
“countries that would like even more of a permanent presence.”78 The Defense Cooperation 
Agreement was signed by SecState Condoleezza Rice and Romanian Foreign Minister Razvan 
Ungureanu in Bucharest on December 6th, 2005. Within the document, both parties 
acknowledged how “the presence of United States forces contributes to strengthening the 
security and stability of Romania and the region.”79 At the signing ceremony, Rice added that “it 
is…fitting that the United States and Romania are not just friends…indeed our forces are 
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brothers and sisters in arms in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans.”80 Having secured access to 
bases in Romania, the Bush administration had integrated U.S defense goals with those of its 
NATO ally in the Black Sea.  
Following Romania’s accession to NATO, the Bush administration made repeated efforts to 
assure the GOR of America’s security commitments to Bucharest. At a press conference with 
Romanian President Traian Băsescu during his visit to the White House in March 2005, Bush 
claimed that “the Romanian people need not worry about their security, that the United States, 
through NATO and through bilateral relations, is committed to the security of our friend.”81 
U.S.-Romania ties under Bush also featured U.S. promotion of Romania’s leadership throughout 
the Black Sea region. During a separate exchange with Băsescu in July 2006, Bush assured his 
counterpart that “Romania’s role in this area and in her neighborhood is a vital role…because 
this area of the world is one where there’s emerging democracies.”82 While the United States has 
held its end of the deal in advancing Romania’s candidacy, the GOR throughout the Bush 
administration upheld its commitments to the USG as well. Efforts by the Romanian Parliament 
to withdraw troop contingents deployed to Iraq in 2006 were rebuffed by Băsescu, despite 
support from then-Prime Minister Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu. Subsequent high-level meetings 
between government ministers pertaining to political and military matters occurred relatively 
often under Bush compared to prior administrations, as the unfolding GWOT and 
counterinsurgency efforts required consistent coordination from both governments. Both parties 
signed a bilateral extradition treaty in Bucharest in September 2007 which updated several 
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clauses which would have conflicted with Romania’s accession into the EU and streamlined 
processes for crimes like money laundering. A separate Protocol to the 1999 Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty provided for smoother coordination between Romanian judicial and internal 
ministries and U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the FBI. As cooperation over joint law enforcement matters expanded, allegations 
persisted throughout the Bush administration that Romania had agreed to host a “black site” for 
the CIA’s extrajudicial torture and interrogation of alleged members of terrorist groups like Al-
Qa’eda. In 2018, the European Court of Human Rights fined the GOR €100,000 over the 
treatment of several suspects at such secret prisons, yet neither the USG nor the GOR has ever 
acknowledged their existence. Despite claims of covert activity related to the GWOT, Romania 
nevertheless pursued a course of closer political and military ties with Washington during the 
Bush administration.  
On economic matters the Bush administration continued to press for increased American 
private investment in Romania as well as further developing bilateral trade relations. Although 
economic affairs were not the main focus of bilateral ties, they played an important factor during 
Romania’s 2007 admission into the EU. Prior to receiving membership, the Bush administration 
was prepared to protect the capital and investments of U.S. multinational companies operating 
throughout Romania in the case of Romania’s joining the body. The Additional Protocol 
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment was signed in Brussels 
on December 9th, 2003 in the hopes of “preserv[ing] the U.S. BIT with Romania, with which the 
United States has an expanding relationship, and the protections it affords U.S. investors even 
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after Romania joins the EU.”83 Bush discussed removing barriers to entry into the Romanian 
market for U.S. investors during a July 2004 state visit by Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, stating 
that “American companies will take a look at Romania…There is commerce going back and 
forth, which is a positive development.” Yet overall, political and military concerns took 
precedence over economic affairs under Bush.  
Apart from seeing Romania through to NATO membership as well as negotiating an 
American military presence on U.S. soil, the highlight of U.S.-Romania ties during the Bush 
administration was the 2008 Bucharest Summit and Bush’s subsequent state visit. At the 
Summit, the GOR showcased its ability to lead among the CEE member states in broadening the 
alliance’s focus on affairs such as cyber and energy security. With Russia’s Vladimir Putin in 
attendance, the gathering was regarded as an opportunity to both reevaluate the GWOT’s 
progress and continue Brussels’ dialogue with Moscow. Romania and Washington advocated for 
the same issues: extending a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia, 
developing an alliance-wide ballistic missile defense (BMD) shield, and encouraging other 
member states to meet the pact’s minimum standard of 2% of GDP on defense spending. During 
his remarks at the Summit, Bush made sure to mention Romania’s impactful contributions to the 
security of the alliance: 
I have confidence that NATO is ready for the challenges of the 21st century because I have 
confidence in the courage of allies like Romania. The Romanian people have seen evil in 
their midst, and they’ve seen evil defeated. They value freedom because they’ve lived 
without it. And this hard experience has inspired them to fight and sacrifice for the liberty of 
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others. That is precisely what Romanian forces are doing on behalf of this alliance…We 
value our friendship with Romania, and we value the Atlantic alliance that we share.84   
Whereas his predecessor Bill Clinton elevated ties with Bucharest to the plane of the 
Strategic Partnership, the events of 9/11 and the GWOT provided a suitable strategic landscape 
for Bush to recognize the value of furthering U.S. relations with Romania. Acknowledging the 
GOR’s contributions to peacekeeping efforts and the will of the Romanian people to remain in 
the West, the Bush administration pushed for Romania’s inclusion in the alliance. Agreements 
such as the Status of Forces and other instruments integrated Romanian and U.S. national 
security goals so that Washington could achieve its objectives in the Middle East while 
Bucharest became a security provider in the Black Sea. Under such circumstances, U.S.-
Romania ties were primed for another upgrade under the Obama administration.  
V. Barack Obama: Reinforcing Regional Stability 
When Obama entered office in January 2009, Romanian-American relations already had 
come a long way since 1989 – Romania was a NATO and EU member and had begun to assume 
various security responsibilities as NATO’s leading member state in the Black Sea region. 
Nevertheless, the Obama administration saw an opportunity to further expand the GOR’s 
contribution both within NATO and its bilateral ties with Washington. Taking plans for a 
transatlantic missile defense program from his predecessor and redrawing the blueprint to 
include states like Romania, President Barack Obama offered an opportunity for Bucharest to 
further solidify its status as a dependable member of the alliance by hosting one of the missile 
sites. The BMD plan, unveiled as the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in 
                                                          
84 Bush, George W. "Remarks in Bucharest, Romania." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 44, no. 13 
(2008): 461. 
  49  
 
September 2009, would feature a base located at Deveselu which would host an Aegis Ashore 
system – a defensive system featuring SM-3 Interceptors targeting short-to-intermediate range 
missiles. The system, successfully installed in 2015, was decried by the Kremlin as an offensive 
apparatus which poses a threat to Russian national security, an allegation which both Brussels 
and Washington have firmly denied. With Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 
and its escalation of the civil war in eastern Ukraine, President Obama took steps to bolster 
NATO and individual member states’ confidence, especially those closest to the action like 
Romania. Through programs like the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and steps taken at 
NATO meetings like the Wales and Warsaw Summits, the Obama administration sought to work 
with member states on the alliance’s eastern flank to combat Russian aggression in the area and 
respond to their demands for an increased troop presence. Thus, the Obama administration 
ensured that the United States would support Romania not only with respect to its binding 
commitment to the latter’s security as a NATO ally, but also as a Strategic Partner in upholding 
transatlantic security and regional stability in the Black Sea.  
“To put it simply, our new missile defense architecture in Europe will provide stronger, 
smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's allies,” Obama declared during 
his remarks on September 17th, 2009.85 The 44th President was explaining his administration’s 
upgrade of the Bush BMD plan covering continental Europe. After public opinion soured in the 
two CEE states that were projected to host the sites – the Czech Republic and Poland – Obama 
sought to redefine not only the scope of the project, but also its reach. NATO allies such as 
Romania were only partially covered by the Bush blueprint, and Bucharest’s strategic position in 
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countering potential short-and-medium-range intercontinental missile attacks from states like 
Iran provided the alliance with an advantage. The Pentagon’s Ballistic Missile Defense Review 
Report outlined four phases of implementing the system throughout continental Europe, 
including the construction and activation of a site in Romania by late 2015.86 Following the 
announcement, talks between Washington and Bucharest on hosting the site included visits to 
Romania by then-Vice President Joe Biden on October 22nd, 2009 and Under Secretary of State 
for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher on February 4th, 2010. Both USG 
officials thanked political and military members of the GOR for their work in support of the 
EPAA. During Tauscher’s visit, the Romanian Supreme Defense Council approved the site 
proposal, and the eight rounds of subsequent negotiations focused on integrating both states’ 
security concerns into a treaty framework.  
The Agreement On the Deployment of the United States Ballistic Missile Defense System in 
Romania was signed by SecState Hillary Clinton and Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor 
Baconschi on September 13th, 2011.87 The text featured clauses stressing the importance of U.S.-
Romanian relations in upholding transatlantic and Black Sea security. Both parties 
acknowledged that “deployment of United States ballistic missile defense interceptors in the 
territory of Romania enhances the existing security relationship between the United States and 
Romania and contributes to international peace and security and to the security of the United 
States, Romania, and NATO.”88 The Romanian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate 
overwhelmingly approved the treaty, signaling public support throughout Romania for the 
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measure. During Băsescu’s visit to Washington for the signing, a separate Joint Declaration on 
Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century was also signed by both parties. The document listed 
areas of cooperation between Washington and Bucharest that had been previously addressed 
(improving NATO interoperability, ensuring regional stability, furthering trade and investment) 
and other aspects of the relationship that can be strengthened (market reform, energy security, 
the rule of law).89 At an October 2013 ceremony to celebrate breaking ground at Deveselu Air 
Base, NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow claimed that “this will make the 
NATO system more robust [and] increase its level of coverage. And it will enhance the level of 
protection the alliance can provide.”90  
Although Aegis Ashore is a defensive system, Russia contends that it is meant to undermine 
Moscow’s nuclear deterrent. Upon NATO’s declaring the site operational in May 2016, a 
Russian Foreign Ministry official labeled it a “step towards the military and political 
containment of Russia.”91 Officials in both Washington and Brussels have parried those concerns 
by claiming that the Romanian Aegis Ashore site can only intercept short and medium-range 
missiles, thereby not affecting the Kremlin’s long-range cruise missiles.92 NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that, “"Russia knows this is not directed against them. They 
know geography, physics makes it impossible for this system to undermine Russia's strategic 
deterrent.”93 The addition of continental BMD to Romania’s portfolio as a member of NATO 
                                                          
89 “Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century Between the United States of America and 
Romania.” U.S. Department of State, September 13, 2011. 
90 Little, Vince. “US, Romania Begin Work on Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Complex.” U.S. Army, October 31, 
2013. https://www.army.mil/article/114203/us_romania_begin_work_on_aegis_ashore_missile_defense_complex.    
91  Beardsley, Steven. “US Certifies Missile Site, Tries to Reassure Russia.” Stars and Stripes, May 12, 2016. 
https://www.stripes.com/news/us-certifies-missile-site-tries-to-reassure-russia-1.409218. 
92 Mutler, Alison. “NATO Shows Off Missile Base in Romania, Calling It 'Purely Defensive'.” 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, November 25, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-shows-off-missile-base-in-
romania-calling-it-purely-defensive-/30291193.html.  
93 Barnes, Julian E. "U.S. and NATO Officials Inaugurate Missile Defense Shield in Romania; The Kremlin Says 
System Is Part of a Policy of Containing Russia." The Wall Street Journal. Eastern Edition (New York, N.Y), 2016. 
  52  
 
boosted its standing within the alliance and further increased its strategic importance as a 
gatekeeper for Euro-Atlantic security. While Deveselu continues to operate as part of the U.S.-
NATO BMD system, progress in constructing the second site at Redzikowo Base in Poland has 
been slow, delaying Phase II of the EPAA. Nevertheless, Romanian participation in the defense 
system has advanced its stature within the alliance as a security provider while also strengthening 
bilateral ties with Washington.   
Romania joined the chorus of Western states, multilateral bodies, and international 
organizations in condemning Russia for its activities in eastern Ukraine during the period of 
February to March 2014. By backing pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas and Luhansk regions, 
annexing Crimea through an illegitimate referendum, and conducting hybrid warfare against 
Kiev, Russia hoped to drive a wedge between Ukraine and the West. Ukraine’s hopes of joining 
organizations such as the EU and NATO were stalled as civil war broke out in the east. Russia 
seized the opportunity to utilize the Crimean Peninsula and the strategic naval base at Sevastopol 
in projecting its power throughout the Black Sea region. In response to Moscow’s actions, 
Băsescu claimed that “Romania does not recognize the annexation of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation, nor the 'self-rule' referendums held in the regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, because 
they run counter to the Constitution of Ukraine.”94 In the months following Crimea’s annexation, 
Russia engaged in provocative military exercises in the Baltic Sea, placed infantry and air force 
troops on high alert across all borders with NATO states, deliberately flew dangerously close 
overflights near NATO members’ airspace, and deployed bombers to the Kaliningrad enclave – 
actions intended to upstage the NATO drills on the eastern flank and warn CEE states of drawing 
too close to the West. For former Iron Curtain states like Romania, whose tenuous history with 
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its neighbor to the east has largely dictated its post-Cold War foreign policy, Russia’s behavior 
solidified what they had been warning Brussels of for years.95 As part of the EU’s response, the 
GOR backed sanctions against the Russian government and Russian officials.96  
President Obama sought to demonstrate the United States’ resolve in the face of Russia’s 
belligerent actions in Ukraine and throughout the Black Sea. The 2014 NATO Summit in Wales 
was a pivotal gathering for the Obama administration’s agenda and Brussels’ agenda moving 
forward. Prior to attending the Summit, the GOR realized that it had to accomplish several 
objectives during the gathering: ensure that the alliance recognizes the strategic threat Russia 
poses to Black Sea stability, prioritize the economic and military potential of the region, and 
position Romania as the leader among the CEE member states in challenging Moscow in the 
region. Putin’s playbook of escalating “frozen” separatist conflicts perpetrated by pro-Russian 
groups such as those in Ukraine could be replicated in states bordering Romania. Neighboring 
Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria, which has harbored Russian troops for over two 
decades, is an example of a pressure point Moscow can exploit. The Kremlin’s expansionist 
agenda, often articulated through the idea of Novorossiya (“New Russia”), seeks to reunite the 
former territories of imperial Russia under one rule. Moscow’s revisionism constitutes a direct 
threat to Romanian security and infringes on Ukrainian sovereignty, which Romania has 
promised to uphold in the face of Russian expansion.97 The GOR brought such concerns 
regarding a Russian takeover of Moldova and a prospective attack on Romania from both land 
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and sea to Wales.98 The Summit focused on enhancing allied readiness and collective responses 
to Russian aggression as well as boolstering member states’ military capabilities. Addressing 
gaps in defense spending - an issue which Obama repeatedly emphasized so that member states 
paid their “fair share”99 - was another important goal of the meeting, as at the time only three 
members had met the 2% GDP standard.100  
The gathering proved to be a turning point in NATO’s trajectory, marking a return to the 
alliance’s core purpose of collective defense. With the conclusion of the ISAF and Russia’s 
challenge to the post-Cold War order, Brussels’ shift in focus from expeditionary capabilities to 
territorial defense was welcomed by the GOR and other CEE states, since it incorporated their 
national security aims. One specific aspect of this change was the creation of the Readiness 
Action Plan (RAP), a “coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to 
the changes in the security environment on NATO's borders and further afield that are of concern 
to Allies.”101 Such changes ranged from Russia’s threat to the eastern flank through hybrid 
warfare to the ramifications of migrants outflows from North Africa and the Middle East for the 
security of NATO’s southern flank. The RAP included “enhancing” the alliance’s NATO 
Response Force (NRF) by developing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a land-
based force stationed throughout Eastern Europe. The VJTF also includes air, maritime, and 
special ops forces for support, and more importantly is rotational so as to ensure member states’ 
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participation in protecting the CEE nations from Moscow’s reach. Responding to criticisms that 
the NRF was too slow in deploying to crisis situations such as the hasty Russo-Georgian War of 
2008, the new force is deployable in a matter of five to seven days. With respect to Moscow’s 
flaunting of international law and aggression in Crimea and Ukraine, the alliance affirmed the 
need “to support, as appropriate, regional efforts by Black Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring 
security and stability.” Romania was chosen as the linchpin of such efforts with U.S. support.  
The Obama Administration complemented such efforts to reform the alliance’s force posture 
as well as embolden its members on the eastern flank by unveiling the European Reassurance 
Initiative (ERI) on June 3rd, 2014. The program funds several strategic security measures 
pertaining to NATO and transatlantic security, including increasing the rotational presence of 
troops, expanding U.S. troop responsiveness to crisis situations in Europe, and developing the 
defense capacities of partner states like Ukraine and Georgia.102 Appropriations for the program 
increased under Obama from less than the initial $1 billion to $3.4 billion by fiscal year 2017.103 
The ERI has allowed the United States to enhance its involvement in NATO’s post-2014 defense 
proposals, from sending four additional F-15Cs to assist the alliance’s Baltic Sea Air Policing 
Mission to committing several thousand troops to the NRF. Operation Atlantic Resolve (OAR) – 
one of the administration’s initiatives under the ERI – was designed for the U.S. to help NATO 
member states sustain their military readiness in crisis situations. OAR funds joint U.S.-
Romanian exercises such as live firings at the Smardan Training Area and the Joint National 
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Training Center at Cincu.104 Aboard the U.S. naval cruiser Vella Gulf in during its Black Sea 
journey in June 2014, U.S. SecDef Chuck Hagel reiterated the administration’s commitment to 
Black Sea regional stability: “We're grateful for what you're doing at a very important time in the 
world, in particular this mission that you're on.”105 
Prior to the 2014 Summit, where members acknowledged that “our overall security and 
defense depend both on how much we spend and how we spend it,” the GOR pledged to meet 
the 2% mark as well as spend over 20% within its defense budget on acquiring weaponry by 
2017.106 The latter pursuit had already begun before Wales, when Romania purchased a group of 
F-16s manufactured by U.S. contractor Lockheed Martin from Portugal.107 During the Wales 
Summit, Romania offered to host a NATO command center to conduct exercises and coordinate 
activities with neighboring allies like Bulgaria.108 Brussels responded to Romania’s offer by 
approving the construction of the Multinational Divisional Headquarters Southeast (MND-SE) as 
part of the RAP. The regional hub was activated on December 1st, 2015 with 280 personnel from 
various member states. The headquarters assured NATO members of an “increased readiness and 
capability, not only for the Southeast region, but for all NATO territories,” according to head of 
its operational control, Lieutenant General Alain Parent.109 A NATO Force Integration Unit 
(NFIU) operates within the headquarters, another RAP initiative aimed at fostering collaboration 
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between the Romanian armed forces and the VJTFs. In addition to providing responses to crisis 
situations, the NFIUs help develop logistical networks and support regional infrastructure 
throughout Romania.110 At Wales, the GOR doubled-down on its commitment to strengthening 
the defense capacities of the alliance’s partners to the east - Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia – in 
cybersecurity and counterintelligence. Programs like the Defense Capacity Building Initiative 
and Interoperability Platform Initiative, launched at Wales, provide the means for Romania to 
foster such improvements.111 Thus, Romania took charge of NATO’s doctrinal shift against 
Moscow by developing NATO partners’ defense capabilities in addition to hosting a new 
command center with forward-deployed units capable of responding to Russian aggression. 
At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, members’ focus remained on strengthening the 
alliance’s capabilities on its eastern flank in the hopes of further countering Russian aggression 
on NATO’s periphery. Having demonstrated their resilience and eagerness to provide for the 
alliance’s defense posture in the east, CEE member states from Estonia to Bulgaria stressed their 
willingness to receive more security responsibilities from Brussels. With analysts claiming that 
the Baltics are Moscow’s next target, member states agreed to establish an Enhanced Forward 
Presence (eFP) in the Baltic Sea region, deploying four multinational battalions (4,000 troops) 
which rotate between Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. However, the Black Sea, now a 
vital launching point for Moscow with Russia’s military intervention in Syria in September 2015, 
was still a turbulent site of NATO-Russia tensions. Recognizing how Russia’s “use of its 
military presence in the Black Sea to project power into the Eastern Mediterranean has posed 
further risks and challenges for the security of Allies and others,” Brussels provided additional 
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resources for Black Sea littoral nations.112 A Tailored Forward Presence (tFP) was created for 
southeastern member states, located at Romania’s MND-SE headquarters. Moreover, the alliance 
promised to evaluate “options for a strengthened NATO air and maritime presence” in the 
region, allowing Romania to continue to promote interoperability between the alliance’s various 
domains. Member states including Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United 
States agreed to contribute land and air sources along with naval vessels to assist with such 
efforts.113 The Black Sea regional tFP includes increases in military exercises, improvements in 
mission command, and a continuation of NATO’s Black Sea Air Policing Mission. Other means 
to strengthen defensive posture and increase situational awareness within the area include 
providing coastal radar systems to Romania and Bulgaria. 
While the GOR welcomed such developments, its primary objective of receiving Brussels’ 
approval for a permanent naval task force for the Black Sea was not accomplished. Member 
states were split between those who favored such deterrence in the face of Russia’s maritime 
aggression in the area and those concerned about following the guidelines set by the 1936 
Montreux Convention, a treaty which mandates that non-littoral states’ ships are not permitted to 
stay longer than 21 days.114 After initially agreeing to advocate for the project at Warsaw with 
Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borissov eventually 
withdrew his support, hurting the chances for the proposal’s approval.115 Germany and other 
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Western European countries like France and Italy, focused on promoting the pact’s dialogue with 
Russia, were unmoved by Bucharest’s appeals and instead offered to intensify joint naval 
exercises on the Black Sea.116 The United States, however, has demonstrated its commitment to 
regional security in the Black Sea through its freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs). U.S. 
naval ships like the USS Porter and the USS Mount Whitney execute FONOPs in the Black Sea, 
often conducting port-of-calls in Romania’s port city of Constanța. Despite the rejection of the 
permanent Black Sea naval presence, the Warsaw Summit saw Romania commit to the alliance’s 
new mission of deterrence on the eastern flank and ensure, in the words of Stoltenberg, “that an 
attack against one Ally will be met by forces from across the Alliance.”117 At both Wales and 
Warsaw, the Obama administration publicly supported measures which provided CEE states like 
Romania with opportunities to expand its portfolio within NATO in response to the strategic 
threat from Moscow.  
Throughout its eight years in office, the Obama administration sought to uphold the United 
States’ security commitments to Romania both bilaterally through the Strategic Partnership and 
through NATO measures, each of which increased Romania’s responsibility for Black Sea 
security. As the alliance’s security commitments shifted toward expeditionary measures, 
Bucharest and Washington adapted with them, each contributing their share to Article V 
standards. When the world witnessed Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine and Crimea in 2014, the 
GOR pledged to uphold Black Sea security and respond to potential Russian incursions on 
NATO’s eastern flank. The United States’ role under Obama was to support Bucharest’s claims 
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as the provider of regional stability through initiatives like OAR and the ERI. Obama also 
envisioned a greater role for Romania with the latter’s hosting a site as part of the EPAA. Since 
the signing of the BMD treaty in 2011, Romanian contributions to missile defense have grown 
exponentially with the activation of Aegis Ashore in 2016. Other aspects of U.S.-Romanian 
relations were strengthened during Obama’s tenure as well. In addition to its BMD capacity, 
Romania actively engages with the United States in counterterrorism, cybersecurity, anti-hybrid 
warfare, and maritime stability measures, among others. Bush may have been the first U.S. 
President to welcome Romania into NATO, yet it was Obama who supported the GOR’s desire 
to take on more responsibility for regional security within the alliance. In remarks delivered 
during a press conference with Stoltenberg on January 21st, 2019 celebrating Romania’s 15 years 
in NATO, President Iohannis stressed his country’s “clear commitment to remain not only a 
strong but reliable Ally. As I said a lot of times Romania firmly supports a strengthening of the 
Alliance. We rely on a strong, sound transatlantic relationship which is indispensable for the 
security and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic space.”118 As NATO looks to further its capabilities 
to meet future security challenges and threats to transatlantic stability, the U.S. will play a 
notable role as one of the leaders of the alliance in providing a vision for other member states to 
follow. The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th President in 2016 proved to be a litmus test 
on whether Washington could definitively articulate such a vision to member states like Romania 
going forward. 
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I. Introduction 
During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump ran on a platform which sought to 
put “America First.” Trump and his coterie of advisors viewed America’s commitments abroad 
through a neo-isolationist lens. Do these ties truly benefit the United States and what strategic 
value do they offer Washington?119 For many foreign policy analysts, the U.S.-led postwar 
international order seemed to be unraveling before their eyes as the 45th President deemed 
NATO “obsolete” and claimed that Washington could “moderate” its support for the defense 
pact if more member states did not meet the 2% spending goal.120 It seemed as if by forfeiting 
America’s position as head of the alliance, Trump would weaken U.S. ties with individual 
member states like Romania by extension. Whereas previous administrations had made support 
through NATO an important pillar of U.S. policy toward Romania, Trump entered office in 2017 
with the intention of potentially upending years of progress by scraping U.S. commitments to the 
pact. Questions surrounding future U.S. engagement with NATO under Trump inevitably led to 
concerns regarding other aspects of Washington’s ties with Bucharest. How would the U.S.-
Romania Strategic Partnership, which the USG had invested considerable resources into since 
the Clinton era, fare in the eyes of skeptical White House officials? Would the Obama 
administration’s ERI face deep budget cuts or outright termination, leaving CEE allies including 
Romania with minimal U.S. funding to deter Russian aggression? Having heard Trump’s calls 
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during the 2016 campaign to “shake the rust off America’s foreign policy,” officials in both 
Brussels and Bucharest braced themselves for the worst under the incoming administration.121    
However, throughout its four years in office the Trump administration continued its 
predecessors’ policy of supporting Romania across all fronts – politically, militarily, and 
economically. Since first receiving Iohannis at the White House in June 2017, Trump has 
advanced efforts to strengthen Romania’s democracy, further its economic prospects through 
bilateral cooperation in sectors like energy and technology, and ensure its preparedness in the 
face of Russian and Chinese security threats. The last point is the most significant, since over the 
past several years an era of great power competition among the United States, Russia, and China 
has spread to the Black Sea region. The area, long fought over by empires and kingdoms 
throughout history, holds renewed strategic importance, as the prospect of holding influence over 
the region and its development can further each state’s geopolitical objectives. The architects of 
U.S. policy toward Romania throughout Trump’s term were top officials at USG agencies 
throughout the bureaucratic apparatus. Although Trump personally hailed progress on certain 
aspects of U.S.-Romania relations such as increased commercial ties between both nations or 
Bucharest’s commitment to 2% spending within NATO, administration executives at the 
Pentagon, DOS, and other public institutions primarily crafted bilateral ties with Romania. Under 
their stewardship, the administration’s feats included signing a 10-year joint “Roadmap for 
Defense Cooperation” with the GOR and replacing state-owned Chinese firms for U.S. 
companies in sectors like nuclear energy, among others. In achieving these objectives, the Trump 
administration upheld U.S. leadership in the Black Sea rather than withdrew it, ensuring that 
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Washington will not only continue to have a stake in the great power showdown within the 
region but will “double-down” its commitment by strengthening its ties with littoral states like 
Romania. 
By continuing previous efforts by U.S. presidents to further anchor Romania in the West 
while deterring Russia and other geopolitical rivals, the Trump administration has promoted the 
GOR’s role as a security provider in the Black Sea – a region which has grown increasingly 
dynamic since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. In this context, the administration’s 
combination of political support, economic deal-making, and military reinforcement in the 
United States’ relations with Romania is reminiscent of the Cold War-era “flexible response” 
doctrine. However, whereas the original strategy under the Kennedy administration was wielded 
by Washington as a multi-pronged weapon to combat Soviet influence around the world, 
Trump’s approach in the Black Sea and more specifically with Romania was used against both 
Russia and China (though Moscow’s influence in the region is broader in comparison to 
Beijing’s). China’s entry into the region challenges the historical narrative of the Black Sea area 
as a site of a binary power struggle between Russia and the West. Whether through government-
sponsored programs like the BRI or by way of ventures through corporations like Huawei, China 
under President Xi Jinping has sought increased participation within CEE states like Romania. 
Beijing recognizes the economic potential that the Black Sea area provides with respect to 
growth in industries from energy to manufacturing, which is why its measures in Romania have 
aimed at furthering economic and commercial cooperation with the GOR. Although the prospect 
of increased political or military escalation from China seems low at the moment, the Trump 
administration adjusted its flexible response approach to U.S.-Romania relations to counter 
Beijing’s participation in the region along with Russian deterrence.  
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II. Military Ties 
“The people of Romania have endured many, many hardships, but they have made a truly 
remarkable, historical journey. The future of Romania and Romania's relationship with the 
United States is very, very bright.”122 Trump, having been in office for less than five months, 
uttered those words during Iohannis’ visit to the White House on June 9th, 2017. The meeting 
was particularly notable for the fact that Iohannis was the first head of state from the CEE to be 
received by Trump. Thus, a trend began which saw the 45th President grow friendlier with 
leaders from Eastern Europe compared to those from traditional bastions of influence within 
NATO like France and Germany.123 Refusing to endorse the United States’ Article V 
commitment during the May 2017 Brussels Summit, Trump decried member states who had not 
met the 2% spending goal, claiming that “many of these nations owe massive amounts of money 
from past years.”124  It was only during Iohannis’ visit that Trump not only publicly committed 
to Article V, but also assured his Romanian counterpart after their talks that “the relationship has 
been good, but now it’s stronger than ever.”125 Throughout the next several years, Romania 
became the focal point of the United States’ grand strategy in the Black Sea, with military 
support through NATO and bilateral ties with the USG becoming a vital component of the 
strategy. From Romanian acquisitions of U.S. weaponry and technology to joint exercises in the 
Black Sea, the military aspect of U.S.-Romanian relations under Trump received considerable 
attention, especially in the latter half of the administration’s term. At the Pentagon, SecDef Mark 
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Esper stressed Romania’s strategic value in an era where global, multipolar rivalries unfold in 
regions such as the Black Sea with major implications for U.S. influence. Over at DOS, SecState 
Mike Pompeo recognized the need to reinforce Romania politically despite its internal struggles 
in combatting corruption and human trafficking, pledging U.S. support for Bucharest through 
multilateral forums like the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). Each of these measures intended to 
bolster Romania’s military preparedness to meet contemporary security risks in the Black Sea. In 
doing so, the Trump administration advanced previous U.S. presidents’ policies of militarily 
supporting a vital NATO ally in Bucharest.  
One way the administration strengthened military ties with Romania is through Bucharest’s 
acquiring U.S. weaponry and software. Under government programs like the Conventional Arms 
Transfer policy (also known as the “Buy American” plan), Trump officials sought to boost 
American arms exports to other states through deals with private U.S. defense contractors. Such 
programs would “support U.S. defense trade overseas to strengthen security partnerships, 
encourage interoperability, and protect American economic security and jobs.”126 One of the first 
major bilateral arms acquisitions was Washington’s sale of seven PATRIOT missile systems in 
July 2017.127 The $3.9 billion deal, executed through the DOS Foreign Military Sales and firms 
like Raytheon, made Romania the first Black Sea littoral state to host the surface-to-air missile 
system.128 The first delivery was unveiled on September 17th, 2020 during a ceremony at the 
Capu Midia Firing Range, where Romanian Defense Minister Nicolae Ciucă stated that the “set-
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up of the first PATRIOT system is only a first step towards building a formidable air defense 
capability for our country, which will significantly contribute to consolidating deterrence and the 
defense of NATO on its eastern flank.”129 Ambassador Zuckerman followed by noting that 
Romania’s hosting the system “puts the regional balance of power back into closer parity with 
our shared threats” and that “Russia and China are pursuing missile capabilities to dominate the 
West and undo the rules-based order which has sustained global peace and stability for more 
than 50 years.”130 The PATRIOT missiles were part of a broader, integrated air defense system 
which also included the sale of six F-16s to the Romanian Air Force. Despite Bucharest’s notable 
progress in achieving NATO interoperability standards since 2004, the U.S. defense package 
upgraded aspects of its armed forces including its outdated, Warsaw Pact-era MiGs.131 Similar to 
Obama’s approach in persuading Bucharest to host the $800 million Deveselu missile defense 
system, the Trump administration successfully convinced the GOR of the PATRIOT’s strategic 
importance to regional stability. 
The PATRIOT sale was followed up by other major Romanian acquisitions of U.S. 
weaponry, including the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Guided 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS). The February 2018 purchase made Romania the first 
European customer of the two long-range artillery rocket launchers, which it intended to buy as 
part of its push to modernize its armed forces with U.S. hardware.132 The $1.5 billion deal was 
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another notable Foreign Military Sale executed through the DOS, with talks dating back to 
August 2017.133 By ordering three HIMARS along with 81 GMLRS, the Romanian military 
vastly increased the force and precision of its firepower against land-based offensives.134 Joint 
U.S.-Romanian exercises with HIMARS have already occurred, as Exercise Rapid Falcon in 
November 2020 allowed the system to be tested during a live fire event at MK Airbase. 
Following the exercise, Romanian Chief of Land Forces Maj. Gen. Julian Berdila echoed 
EUCOM’s upbeat sentiment regarding the HIMARS acquisition by stating how “this is 
fundamental evidence of how the U.S.- Romania military partnership has developed over 
time…This is just part of what is about to come in the future.”135 Apart from advancing 
Romania’s interoperability with U.S. systems, other military sales to the GOR boosted 
Bucharest’s defense capacities – the $300 million sale of two Naval Strike Missile (NSM) 
Coastal Defense Systems (CDS) provided Romania with an improved maritime defense 
capability.136 The CDS allow Bucharest to expand its reach against adversaries at sea with the 
systems’ long-range, anti-ship missiles, designed to counter potential Russian naval 
encroachment on Romanian shores.137  
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While the CDS improved Romanian capabilities against sea-based incursions, the Trump 
administration also explored the sale of Lockheed Martin’s newly-built F-35s to the GOR.138 The 
deal had the potential to vastly improve the performance of the Romanian Air Force and mark 
Romania’s status as a regional security provider, especially as Turkey’s participation in the 
program was suspended in 2019 with Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense 
system.139 While the administration never executed the sale, Romania’s current F-16 fleet 
received a $175 million upgrade of its GPS, avionics, and software in November 2020.140 From 
delivering PATRIOT missiles and HIMARS launchers to F-16 upgrades, each FMS through the 
Trump administration’s “Buy American” plan has paved the way for Romania’s acquisition of 
vital weaponry from U.S. contractors like Lockheed Martin, which has sought to boost 
investment within Romania. Lockheed’s September 2020 signing of a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) with the GOR’s Romaero to locally manufacture its Blackhawk 
helicopters was hailed by Zuckerman as a “great collaboration between our three countries to 
advance and preserve the cause of freedom.”141 During talks with Romanian Foreign Minister 
Bogdan Aurescu and Zuckerman in January 2020, Lockheed CEO Marillyn Hewson stressed the 
advantages of Romania’s industrial base for future projects related to developing artificial 
intelligence and other technology for both military and civilian use.142 The actions of Trump 
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administration officials at the Pentagon and DOS in modernizing Romania’s armed forces not 
only assured increased deterrence against Bucharest’s external threats, but also furthered U.S. 
economic interests by developing the Romanian defense industry.  
Heeding Trump’s call for member states to meet NATO’s minimum 2% GDP spending 
standard, the GOR announced on August 1st, 2017 its intention to meet the target through 
2026.143 The approval of the $11.5 billion procurement plan by the National Supreme Defense 
Council signaled Romania’s resolve to conform to U.S. expectations of fellow member states 
under Trump.144 The measure made Romania the sixth member out of 28 to meet the benchmark 
at the time. Talk of the PATRIOT sale and increases in defense spending occurred while U.S. 
forces participated with their Romanian counterparts in Exercise Saber Guardian 17 – an annual, 
multinational command post and field training exercise hosted in Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary. Of the 18 EUCOM-led Black Sea Region exercises in 2017, Saber Guardian was the 
largest with 25,000 service members from 23 allied and partner nations.145 In the eyes of the 
then-EUCOM head Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the combat-training games provided an opportunity to 
build “a stronger ‘forward defense force’ in Central and Eastern Europe to counteract new 
regional threats.”146 A year after NATO member states committed to developing the tFP in the 
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Black Sea at the Warsaw Summit, the Trump administration further bolstered Romania’s defense 
posture through multilateral exercises in the region.  
Such exercises fell under OAR and the European Deterrence Initiative (the Obama-era ERI 
was renamed to EDI in 2017). The initiative, designed to assist NATO allies in countering 
threats to continental security since its inception in 2014, received increased funding under 
Trump. Inheriting a total of $3.4 billion for the program in fiscal year 2017, the administration 
increased the budget to $4.8 billion the next year and to a high of $6.5 billion in fiscal year 
2019.147 Since the majority of the funds are allocated to EUCOM under OAR, joint exercises 
occurred frequently with the armed forces of member states on NATO’s eastern flank to ensure 
the “continuous presence of U.S. forces in Europe’s air, land, and waters,” a component of the 
2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy.148 Joint exercises like Sea Breeze, an annual training 
where U.S. destroyers from the 6th Fleet engage with ships from Romania and other allied navies 
in the Black Sea, improved readiness in other military domains as well.149 Sea Breeze features 
operations in maritime interdiction, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare designed to enhance 
flexibility and strengthen combined response capacities.150 In the air, although the United States 
does not participate in NATO’s Black Sea Air Policing Mission, EDI funds have been set aside 
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to renovate existing bases in Romania which host U.S. Air Force (USAF) jets.151 More recently, 
funding through the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act includes $130.5 million for 
reconstruction to add additional fighter rotations at Câmpia Turzii Air Base in central 
Romania.152 Such projects showcase how the Trump administration promoted EDI as a 
mechanism for the U.S. to further engage with Bucharest in developing its military preparedness 
in the face of Russian aggression in the Black Sea.   
Throughout the Trump presidency, Moscow proceeded in its efforts to undermine Western 
resolve through its brazen actions in the Black Sea region and substantial build-up of the BSF. 
The Kremlin has repeatedly violated the territoriality of neighboring Ukraine, issued numerous 
hostile statements toward CEE states like Romania and Bulgaria, and deliberately encroached 
upon NATO members’ air and maritime space. One common method the Russians have 
employed to intimidate U.S. and other NATO allies is intentionally flying their jets close to 
vessels conducting FONOPS in the Black Sea. The USS Porter, a Navy destroyer based in Rota, 
Spain which supplements Deveselu’s Aegis Ashore system, was buzzed by Russian planes at a 
dangerously low altitude numerous times during one particular incident on February 10th, 
2017.153 Another provocative instance occurred on November 25th, 2018, when the Russian Navy 
stopped and attacked three Ukrainian vessels entering the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait, 
injuring six Ukrainian sailors and arresting 23 others.154 The incident proved Putin’s intent to 
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exploit control over the Crimean Peninsula as a way to choke off access to vital Ukrainian ports 
like Mariupol and Berdyans’k.155 Pompeo denounced Russia’s actions as “a dangerous escalation 
and a violation of international law.”156 Following the United States’ lead in condemning 
Moscow, the Romanian Foreign Ministry released a statement claiming that “aggression & 
violation of international law undermine the security of the whole region.”157  
In an attempt to match the rigor and pace of NATO’s multilateral exercises in the Black Sea, 
major Russian war games like Kavkaz-20 in September 2020 featured operations meant to test 
the combat readiness of the BSF and Russia’s Southern Military District.158 The inclusion of 
Chinese troops among the 80,000 personnel participating in the exercises was notable, as was the 
BSF’s test firing of a new cruise missile.159 Along with snap exercises to test the preparedness of 
the BSF, Moscow has undertaken a massive rebuilding effort to introduce new ships to the fleet 
as well as upgrade its combat capacities in future regional crisis situations. Three new Admiral 
Grigirovich-class missile frigates equipped with launch systems capable of firing Kalibr and Buk 
missiles have been added to the Russian base at Sevastopol.160 The BSF’s Fourth Submarine 
Brigade, stationed at the Russian port of Novorossiysk, includes what experts agree is one of the 
stealthiest diesel-electric submarines in service today – adaptable for patrols throughout the 
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Black Sea as well as assisting a land-based assault.161 The Russians have already put the BSF to 
the test, integrating it into their operations against rebel groups in Syria in their effort to back 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime.162 Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the modernization of its BSF have 
left littoral states like Romania feeling uncertain over the region’s security in the face of 
Moscow’s belligerent behavior. Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Meleșcanu articulated the 
GOR’s concerns best when he claimed that at one point, “we had a saying: The Black Sea is 
Romania’s best neighbor. Not even the Black Sea is a good neighbor anymore, due to Crimea’s 
militarization and the dramatic change in the area’s strategic balance.”163  
Putin’s provocative actions demonstrate his determination to challenge Washington and 
Brussels’ leadership in the Black Sea. In response, Trump administration officials at the 
Pentagon and DOS recognized the necessity of a reinforced U.S. military posture in the region. 
During his remarks on July 29th, 2020, Esper announced plans to redeploy 11,900 service-
members from U.S. bases in Germany – 5,600 of whom will be transferred to other NATO 
member states on the alliance’s eastern flank in the Baltics, Poland, and Romania. Describing the 
repositioning of troops away from Germany (where they have been concentrated since the Cold 
War), Esper noted how the decision “achieve[s] the core principles of enhancing U.S. and NATO 
deterrence of Russia; strengthening NATO; reassuring Allies; and, improving U.S. strategic 
flexibility and EUCOM operational flexibility.”164 While the SecDef stressed the measure’s 
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strategic value, Trump saw it as rightful retaliation against a German government which had 
been reluctant to meet the 2% spending goal despite enjoying the economic benefits of a large 
U.S. military presence there. Hours after Esper’s announcement, the 45th President claimed in an 
interview that “Germany is a wealthy country and they have to pay and we’re not going to have 
52,000 troops in Germany where they make a fortune off of the troops.”165  
While members of Congress denounced the repositioning as a “grave error,” Esper and other 
administration officials framed it as a way to increase U.S. operational flexibility in the Black 
Sea region.166 Part of the redeployments included the movement of a Stryker brigade – a major 
maneuver force within the U.S. Army which includes weaponry from Javelin anti-tank missiles 
to a SHORAD air defense system – to Romania. Transferring the Stryker brigade intended to 
solve the mobility issues with Romania’s poor transport system while deterring potential Russian 
moves toward Romania’s border either through Crimea or an invasion of Ukraine.167 Expressing 
appreciation to the Trump administration for its decision to reposition personnel throughout the 
Black Sea region, Iohannis reaffirmed that U.S. troops are always “welcome in Romania.”168 
Washington’s move to redeploy troops from Germany and buttress NATO’s eastern flank was 
not entirely without precedent, as Bush’s July 2004 decision to decrease troop levels in Germany 
by 38,000 also reflected a desire to shift U.S. strategic posture eastward. At the time, Romania 
had only just joined NATO, and the measure reinforced the United States’ steadfast support for 
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the newly-admitted CEE member states and their security objectives. Scholars drew comparisons 
between the Bush and Trump administration moves and their impact on allies like Romania. 
Former Bush administration official Marc A. Thiessen stated that “Eastern European allies…are 
all meeting or even exceeding their defense spending commitments. There is nothing wrong with 
rewarding those countries for their steadfastness by moving American troops out of Germany 
and stationing them on the territory of more reliable allies.”169 U.S. National Security Adviser 
Robert O’Brien defended the administration’s move in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, writing that 
“modern warfare is increasingly expeditionary and requires platforms with extended range, 
flexibility and endurance. While air bases and logistics hubs remain important, the Cold War-
style garrisoning of troops makes less military and fiscal sense than it did in the 1970s.”170 
Despite claims that the redeployment of troops was ultimately the result of Trump’s politically-
motivated grievances against Berlin, the considerations of administration officials such as Esper 
and O’Brien prevailed in ensuring that the USG would provide flexible means of support to 
NATO allies like Romania.  
Moreover, the Pentagon under Esper decided to go a step further beyond reviewing and 
redeploying U.S. troops throughout NATO member states, an action dealing mostly with land-
based components. In an effort to advance intelligence-gathering missions in the Black Sea 
region as well as provide a buffer to Russian encroachment into NATO and Romanian airspace, 
the Trump administration announced the deployment of 90 USAF personnel and a squadron of 
MQ-9 Reaper drones to Câmpia Turzii base in Romania on January 5th, 2021. Officials noted the 
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drones’ advantages in advancing Romanian security: providing early warning of hostile 
activities, developing the Romanian Air Force’s operational capacity with drone technology, and 
monitoring Russian movements in the Black Sea.171 Having invested millions in renovating the 
Câmpia Turzii airbase under Trump, the decision to reinforce U.S. support in the Black Sea 
through the deployment of the Reaper drones in the last days of the Trump presidency showed 
administration officials’ determination to ensure U.S. support for Romanian security. During 
2018 talks to transfer the drones from their home base in Poland, one Romanian military official 
remarked that “this project is a sign that you really care and you want to develop the relationship 
you have here in Romania.”172 The squadron of MQ-9 Reapers will back up the present two 
squadrons of modernized MiG-21 aircraft and two Puma helicopter squadrons.173 The decisions 
to move troops from Germany to Romania as well as intensify U.S. presence at Romanian bases 
like Câmpia Turzii were part of a broader vision by the Trump administration to bolster the 
United States’ posture against China and Russia throughout the globe.   
During his remarks at an Atlantic Council event on October 20th last year, Esper outlined the 
Trump administration’s objective of strengthening America’s alliances while competing with 
great power adversaries like China and Russia:  
Today, our global constellation of allies and partners remain an enduring strength that our 
competitors and adversaries simply cannot match...However, our ability to maintain this 
advantage is not preordained, nor can we take our longstanding network of relationships for 
granted...our primary competitors – China and Russia – are rapidly modernizing their armed 
forces, and using their growing strength to ignore international law, violate the sovereignty of 
smaller states, and shift the balance of power in their favor...Today, I’d like to share with you 
two recent initiatives that will help us do just that: the first being the brand new Department 
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of Defense Guidance for Development of Alliances and Partnerships – we call it the GDAP – 
and the second being Defense Trade Modernization. Together, these efforts will help us build 
the capacity and capabilities of like-minded nations and foster interoperability with friendly 
militaries, while promoting a stronger domestic industrial base that can compete in the global 
marketplace.174 
By allowing the Pentagon to better synchronize security cooperation activities with U.S. 
allies and partners across the world while developing the resiliency of their militaries, the GDAP 
provides an effective counter to China and Russia’s reach in regions like the Black Sea. 
Meanwhile, the Defense Trade Modernization initiative seeks to expedite defense export 
processes which the SecDef noted in his speech as often being “too slow, opaque, and 
complicated.” Romania and the Black Sea region overall had already become the focus of both 
Pentagon policies by the time Esper unveiled them. On October 8th, Esper welcomed his 
Romanian counterpart Ciucă to Washington, where the two officials signed a ten-year roadmap 
for bilateral defense cooperation which encompassed common interests including increasing 
interoperability and safeguarding Black Sea security.175 At the joint press conference, Esper 
assured his Romanian colleague that the USG supports strengthening Romania’s defense 
capacity in the face of Russian revanchism on its borders, claiming that “the United States' 
commitment to NATO and Article 5 is ironclad, and we will continue to stand shoulder-to-
shoulder with Romania as we advance peace, democracy, freedom and our other shared values.” 
Ciucă followed up by stating that “Romania and U.S. are unlocking the potential of the Black 
Sea...We are ready to further expand our cooperation and adding more substance in domains 
such as plans and pre-positioning, military modernization, cyber, land, air, and military 
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operation, training and exercises.”176 Previous high-level consultations between defense officials 
under the Trump administration included SecDef Jim Mattis’ meeting with Defense Minister 
Mihai Fifor at the Pentagon in September 2018, where Mattis thanked the GOR for “its 
commitment to realizing a peaceful, prosperous and free world alongside like-minded 
nations.”177 
Prior to Ciucă’s October 2020 visit to Washington, he welcomed U.S. Army Chief of Staff 
Gen. James McConville and EUCOM head Lt. Gen. Christopher Cavoli to Bucharest that 
August. The visit by the two USG military officials occurred in the weeks following the 
administration’s decision to reposition troops from Germany to Romania, and the bilateral 
meeting further developed upon joint security strategies pertaining to the decision.178 The 
bilateral meeting was important in reassuring the GOR of America’s defense commitments, as 
Moscow’s rhetoric on the prospective addition of U.S. troops along NATO’s eastern flank had 
grown increasingly hostile. A statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry at the time claimed 
that “Washington does not conceal that these steps are part of the effort to bolster the so-called 
"north-south axis" from the Baltic to Black Sea, the axis that is to become the line marking 
Russia's containment, with Romania viewed as a key stronghold for projecting power in the 
Black Sea region.”179 McConville reiterated the administration’s resolve to “respond when 
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needed, here, in an important area such as the Black Sea,” while Chief of the Romanian Defense 
Staff Lt. Gen. Daniel Petrescu stressed how “the United States offers us constant support in the 
process of adapting the Romanian armed forces in order to successfully fulfill our missions in a 
complex and dynamic security environment as the Black Sea region.”180 Military ties with 
Romania under the Trump administration thus continued previous U.S. efforts to broaden 
security objectives in the Black Sea region as GOR officials sought to accommodate an increased 
American troop presence in their country. By continuing to integrate U.S. and Romanian national 
security objectives in the region, Trump administration officials hoped to further engage with 
key GOR officials like Ciucă and Petrescu.181 
Along with key figure engagement, another important tenet of the GDAP is optimizing and 
expanding the State Partnership Program (SPP) between the U.S. National Guard and its partner 
countries. Inaugurated in 1993 in order to assist former Warsaw Pact nations in reforming their 
armed forces by connecting them with individual U.S. state National Guard contingents, the SPP 
has grown to 82 participant countries around the world. Romania’s ties with its partner, the 
Alabama National Guard, have deepened under Trump, with administration officials like Esper 
viewing the program as a way to provide equipment, training, and an exchange of best practices 
with U.S. allies. In the context of great power competition with Russia and China, Romania’s 
involvement in the SPP has allowed it to develop its armed forces in fields including joint 
tactical air control, contingency operation support, and cybersecurity.182 Bucharest’s robust 
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participation in the SPP was exemplified in the May 2020 deployment of a Romanian medical 
team to Alabama to assist with the latter’s COVID-19 response.183 The delegation visited 
hospitals throughout the state, discussed pandemic emergency strategies, and shared operational 
tactics. U.S. Maj. Gen. Sheryl E. Gordon, the adjutant general for the Alabama National Guard, 
asserted that “we oftentimes focus on the military aspect of our partnership, but this visit gives us 
an opportunity to focus on the many other benefits of our vital partnership with Romania…We 
certainly consider our Romanian partners as close friends.”184 Strengthening bilateral ties 
through the SPP proved to be another GDAP component which the Trump administration 
implemented to further military relations with Romania.   
For its part, the GOR contributed to sustaining and advancing bilateral military relations 
throughout Trump’s term, incorporating U.S. policies on safeguarding Black Sea security and 
great power competition with China and Russia. The GOR’s National Defence Strategy 2020-
2024 labels Russia’s actions in the Black Sea as a threat to its national security while conveying 
Bucharest’s desire for increased U.S. involvement in the region. The Romanian President is 
mandated to present the security document to Parliament within the first six months of his or her 
term, and Iohannis stressed Romania’s position in regional and global defense affairs within the 
work: 
The potential for escalation of the existing tensions in the region, amid the strengthening of 
the offensive position and aggressiveness/assertiveness of the Russian Federation in recent 
years, and upgrading of the hybrid methods it uses is a major security concern at national 
level. From this perspective, strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture, 
especially on its Eastern flank, through a unitary North-South approach, increasing the EU’s 
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capacity to act together and the USA commitment to the security of the Black Sea region are 
key elements and sustainable solutions to ensure regional stability. One of Romania's 
priorities is to reconfirm the relevance of the Black Sea with its strategic importance in the 
regional security configuration. Given the dynamic of the security environment that features 
a high degree of unpredictability adapting the narrative used to maintain and enhance the 
attention of the USA, NATO and the EU on the strategic importance of the Black Sea is a 
permanent and important process for our country.185 
The repeated mentions of aggressive Russian conduct provoked a furious response from the 
Kremlin, with a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman claiming that, “You know very well that, in the 
West, they use this trick of saddling Russia with the mistakes and other internal issues of the 
EU…The fact that Bucharest plagiarizes this trend shows that Romanian politicians do not have 
a mind of their own.”186 In addition to the National Defence Strategy, the White Papers on 
Defence, which the Supreme Council for National Defense is tasked with executing, also 
recognize the transformation of the Black Sea region into a site for great power rivalry and the 
security risks associated with such a development: 
The big powers competition for the control of common strategic interest areas (the Black Sea 
Region, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Middle East, Asia-Pacific) and the direct or indirect 
involvement of these actors in the developing conflicts have negative consequences over the 
regional security. This happens also during the power falloff of dominating actors on the 
international political scene, due to the reconfiguration of the strategic options and the 
promotion of isolationist/coercive policies within the international relations, concurrently 
with the emergence of major actors, following a strategic coherence provided on different 
action courses in the foreign policy.187 
Despite the increase in tensions and security risks in the region, the White Papers 
nevertheless highlight the GOR’s aim to strengthen the Strategic Partnership with the U.S., since 
it “offers the ideal framework to consolidate the relations between the armed forces of the two 
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countries in order to emphasize the strategic position of Romania in the Black Sea.”188 Within 
both documents, which received overwhelming support in Parliament, Bucharest outlines its 
national security objectives and acknowledges the challenges in fulfilling them, such as 
Moscow’s misinformation campaigns and hybrid warfare. In the face of such risks, the GOR has 
sought to deepen its engagement within NATO and further support U.S. security goals under 
Trump as it has done in the past with previous U.S. administrations. 
Ever since the beginning of the GWOT under Bush, Romania has been a staunch ally in 
advancing Washington and Brussels’ counterterrorism aims. Romania remains one of the largest 
troop contributors to the NATO-led Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, deploying the fifth 
largest contingent with 693 troops as of November 2020.189 U.S. defense analysts note that Black 
Sea littoral states like Romania contribute one-third of all European forces serving in 
Afghanistan, often due to a greater political will to commit manpower to the GWOT.190 In Iraq, 
Romanian military personnel participate in operations with NATO and U.S. partners as a part of 
the campaign against the Islamic State (Operation Inherent Resolve). Despite the temporary 
troop withdrawal following the U.S. airstrike targeting a top Iranian general in Baghdad last 
year, the GOR nevertheless remains committed to redeploying its service-members and 
supporting counterterrorism efforts.191 For Bucharest’s work in fulfilling alliance goals related to 
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the GWOT over the past 20 years, Stoltenberg has repeatedly stressed that Brussels can “count 
on Romania, as on all Allies, to keep up the momentum.”192  
Aside from its involvement in operations in the Middle East, Romania has also followed 
Brussels’ guidance on Russia beyond bolstering its military preparedness against Moscow. On 
July 26th, 2019, the Romanian Foreign Ministry refused to grant a transit permit for a Russian 
shipment of 60 tanks to Serbia due to an EU embargo against Russia.193 The armored vehicles 
were to be shipped via the Danube River to Romania’s pro-Moscow neighbor, yet Bucharest 
held firm in its denial of a permit. The move embodies the GOR’s push to also strengthen its 
patrolling of the Danube, a vital waterway for commercial shipping throughout the CEE region. 
Bucharest has taken steps with Washington and Brussels’ urging to develop its Riverine Flotilla 
Command in recent years, making it Europe’s largest riverine naval force and the first-in-line to 
respond to an amphibious Russian assault through the Danube or its Delta.194 The development 
of the Command’s gunboats has allowed Bucharest to obtain a unique status as one of the few 
powers to have a secure position in deterring asymmetric and hybrid threats in the region.195 
Lt. Gen. Hodges said in a 2018 interview, “Romania is key…Turkey is so focused to its 
south that they have not developed a large presence in the Black Sea. It ends up being Romania 
that’s going to be the center of gravity for the West in countering Russian aggression.”196 At the 
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time, Romania had already purchased the PATRIOT and HIMARS missile systems and 
deepened its engagement with U.S. and NATO forces through joint exercises like Saber 
Guardian and Sea Breeze. Aspects of the Trump administration’s military policy with Romania, 
such as Bucharest’s being one of the few member states to meet the 2% spending mark, were 
hailed personally by the U.S. President himself during bilateral meetings with Iohannis or at 
NATO gatherings. Yet, the administration’s military ties with Romania were shaped primarily by 
administration officials across USG agencies. At the Pentagon, Esper envisioned U.S. allies like 
Romania playing an increasingly vital role in advancing America’s position against great 
powers. At DOS, Pompeo assured Bucharest of U.S. support against Russian revisionism after 
repeated instances of Moscow’s aggression in the Black Sea. Through the “Buy American” plan, 
the Trump administration tailored its defense sales to the GOR’s security needs, modernized 
Bucharest’s military capacity, and increased interoperability standards – three tenets of a security 
strategy that had been implemented by previous U.S. administrations. Taking another playbook 
from the past, the Trump administration sought to reposition U.S. troops from Germany to 
Romania to ensure strategic flexibility in the face of Russian aggression. Meanwhile, the GOR 
has continued to uphold its commitments made over 20 years ago to support the GWOT in its 
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq throughout Trump’s term. Romania has gone out of 
its way to integrate the United States’ security objectives regionally and globally into its own 
through the National Defence Strategy and White Papers. The administration’s measures 
promoted bilateral military engagement and consequently advanced Washington’s support for 
Romania’s security.      
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III. Economic Policies  
Long regarded as a state with untapped potential for economic growth due to its strategic 
location, Romania’s industries from energy to technology has attracted foreign investment in 
both its public and private sectors. Simultaneously, Romania has become the target of Russia’s 
geo-economic schemes, as Moscow seeks increased leverage over CEE states by controlling 
their access to Russian energy sources. Government corruption, financial mismanagement, and 
misinformation campaigns complicate Bucharest’s efforts to counter the Kremlin. The recent 
entry of China in the region has also complicated matters, as Beijing’s development programs 
like the BRI have found receptive ears among Eastern European governments. Meanwhile, the 
rise of 5G has led CEE states like Romania to sign deals with Huawei, which has expanded its 
footprint in the European telecommunications market. Such developments occurred despite the 
Trump administration’s claims that Chinese state-owned corporations have engaged in espionage 
and intellectual property theft. USG officials consequently incorporated these concerns into 
bilateral economic relations with Romania by convincing Bucharest to block Chinese 
commercial expansion and favor Western alternatives. The effort has led to notable successes in 
industries like civil nuclear usage, where the Department of Energy (DOE) signed a deal to 
construct the Cernavodă nuclear reactors instead of a Chinese corporation, and 
telecommunications, where the GOR signed a pledge to refuse to contract state-owned 
companies like Huawei. The Trump administration has also supported the 3SI as a way to spur 
economic development in Romania, ensure military mobility throughout the CEE, and reduce 
reliance on Russian energy. By challenging both Russia and China’s commercial access to 
Romania while expanding opportunities for bilateral economic cooperation, the Trump 
administration was able to further build upon the work of previous U.S. administrations. 
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Ever since Romania’s 2007 admission into the EU, its economy has witnessed growth 
anywhere from four to seven percent annually, making it the fastest-growing economy in the 
body.197 Furthermore, its per capita national output has doubled since 2007 to about 60% of the 
Eurozone average while income per capita reached 70% last year (compared to 50% in 2010).198 
Even during the past year, as the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged national economies and 
industrial bases throughout Europe, Romania’s economy fared better than the rest of the EU 
according to the European Commission.199 In the fourth quarter of 2020, its economy expanded 
more than other EU states at 5.3% and beat output projections.200 However, over 30 years since it 
began its journey from a centrally-planned, socialist economy toward a free market, Romania 
still struggles with issues such as corruption and poor public spending policies. Iliescu and 
subsequent governments’ gradual approach to implementing economic reforms such as 
privatization and currency stabilization has resulted in Romania’s lagging behind its European 
counterparts in a number of metrics. Although the World Bank classified Romania as a “high-
income” country for the first time last year, Romania has the second highest poverty level in the 
EU, with neighboring Bulgaria narrowly beating it.201 Lack of economic opportunity for young 
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professionals has exacerbated Romania’s “brain drain,” as thousands leave each year to find 
work in other EU states.202  
An endemic problem has been the mismanagement of public finances, with fiscal and 
external imbalances prompting bodies like the IMF to issue warnings to Bucharest to get its 
house in order. Part of the reason for the high budget deficits has been the policy of deficit-
driven growth, as the past eight years of parliamentary control by the populist Social Democrat 
Party (PSD) has seen public sector wages increase and inflation rise due to unrestricted 
expenditures. Economists note that under the PSD salaries and pensions comprised 90 per cent of 
public revenue, with the GOR considering options such as “the seizure of pension funds, 
Venezuela-inspired projects to repatriate gold, over-taxation of banks, etc., rigging legislation 
and statistics as weeks went by, in order to suit context and critics.”203 Even before the pandemic 
forced the GOR to increase public sector spending in an effort to revive the economy, the 
European Commission recommended opening an Excessive Deficit Procedure on Romania to 
adjust its spending along member guidelines. By the end of 2020, the budget deficit widened to 
9.8% of GDP, nowhere near the 7% target set by the GOR.204 In a separate report, the European 
Commission also added that “investor confidence is being eroded by persistent legislative 
instability, unpredictable decision-making, low institutional quality and the continued weakening 
of the fight against corruption.”205 The past several years of deficit-spending has had negative 
ramifications for Romania’s markets and credit ratings. It is no wonder then that Prime Minister 
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Florin Cîțu recently stated that, “Today, the state, as it is, drags us down when we talk about 
economic dynamics. It is a brake on the economic development, with all the [budget] arrears, 
with all the problems it has.”206  
Considering such economic woes, U.S. investment in Romania has proceeded cautiously 
over the years. Even as the Strategic Partnership has offered a mechanism for economic ties to 
expand over the past 20 years and the 1992 U.S.-Romanian BIT provides for liberal capital 
transfer, U.S. investment in Romania has paled in comparison to other European states. In 2017, 
the United States ranked 14th in foreign direct investment in Romania (1.5% of total FDI) behind 
EU states like Luxembourg (4.7%) and Cyprus (6.1%).207 By 2019, the United States had 
dropped to 16th place.208 Despite such statistics, Trump has hailed the bilateral economic 
progress made under his administration. During Iohannis’ August 2019 visit to the White House, 
Trump claimed, “We have – we do a lot of trade with Romania, and they’re very talented people. 
We buy, they buy.”209 Ultimately, however, the U.S.-Romania trade relationship remained 
largely unchanged in comparison to previous administrations: exports to and imports from 
Romania have declined throughout Trump’s term, and the U.S. still maintains a trade deficit of 
$1.2 billion.210 Nevertheless, the State Department’s 2019 Investment Climate Statement on 
Romania notes that “U.S. investors have found opportunities in the information technology, 
automotive, telecommunication, energy, services, manufacturing, consumer products sectors, and 
                                                          
206 Ernst, Iulian. “PM Says ‘No Functioning Market Economy’ in Romania.” BNE IntelliNews, March 12, 2021. 
https://www.intellinews.com/pm-says-no-functioning-market-economy-in-romania-205251/.   
207 “Foreign Direct Investment in Romania in 2017.” National Bank of Romania, 2017. 
https://bnro.ro/DocumentInformation.aspx?idDocument=29253&idInfoClass=14364.    
208 “Foreign Direct Investment in Romania 2019.” National Bank of Romania, September 18, 2020. 
https://www.bnr.ro/files/d/Pubs_en/FDI/eFDI2019.pdf.   
209 Trump, Donald J. "Remarks Prior to a Meeting With President Klaus Iohannis of Romania and an Exchange 
With Reporters." Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2019, 1-13.  
210 “Trade in Goods with Romania.” U.S. Census, 2021. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4850.html.   
  90  
 
banking.”211 U.S. corporations active in Romania include industrial giants like Lockheed Martin 
& Ford Romania (Ford’s local subsidiary which maintains an engine factory in Craiova) to 
consumer brands like PepsiCo and Colgate.212 Meanwhile, administration officials like U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce (SecComm) Wilbur Ross have sought to further expand bilateral ties, 
especially as U.S. businesses continue to explore opportunities in Romania through public bodies 
like InvestRomania. The December 15th, 2017 meeting between Ross and Romania’s Trade 
Minister Ilan Laufer saw both officials highlight Washington’s push to modernize Romania’s 
military through acquisitions of U.S. technology and partnerships with U.S. defense 
contractors.213  
U.S.-Romanian economic ties during the Trump administration were not only limited to 
furthering mutual commercial growth and investment. The administration’s recognition of the 
return of great power competition with Russia and China attached political concerns to bilateral 
economic matters between Washington and Bucharest. With respect to Russia, energy and 
cybersecurity are two areas that the U.S. and NATO allies have previously acknowledged as 
alliance vulnerabilities which Moscow can exploit. As for China, Romania’s participation in the 
BRI and its ventures with Chinese companies exemplify Beijing’s push to expand its economic 
reach as a challenge to U.S. global leadership. The Trump administration recognized Moscow 
and Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions early on, noting in the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy: 
Today, the United States must compete for positive relationships around the world. China 
and Russia target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain 
competitive advantages against the United States. China is investing billions of dollars in 
                                                          
211 “2019 Investment Climate Statements: Romania.” U.S. Department of State, 2020. 
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-investment-climate-statements/romania/.   
212 “Major U.S. Companies in Romania.” Consulate General of Romania in New York, 2020. 
https://newyork.mae.ro/en/node/509.   
213 “Meeting with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross.” Embassy of Romania to the United States, 2017. 
https://washington.mae.ro/en/local-news/1684.   
  91  
 
infrastructure across the globe. Russia, too, projects its influence economically, through the 
control of key energy and other infrastructure throughout parts of Europe and Central 
Asia…The United States pursues economic ties not only for market access but also to create 
enduring relationships to advance common political and security interests…The United 
States will shift away from a reliance on assistance based on grants to approaches that attract 
private capital and catalyze private sector activity…By mobilizing both public and private 
resources, the United States can help maximize returns and outcomes and reduce the burden 
on U.S. Government resources…The United States seeks strong partners, not weak ones.214 
The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy also elaborated on the implications of America’s 
rivalry with its geostrategic adversaries. The administration wrote that the “central challenge to 
U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by revisionist 
powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their 
authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and 
security decisions.”215  Consequently, the Trump administration’s great power strategy was 
incorporated in its economic relations with Romania.  
The USG agencies responsible for fulfilling the Trump administration’s geo-economic 
objectives against China in Romania were the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the DOE. 
Both institutions played critical roles in developing and enforcing the administration’s response 
to the growing Chinese business presence in Romania. A notable case is the Cernavodă Nuclear 
Power Plant, a Ceaușescu-era plant which produces 20% of Romania’s electricity through its two 
reactor units.216 In November 2013, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta signed a letter of 
intent with China General Nuclear Power (CGN) to develop Units 3 and 4. Two years later, 
Romania’s Nuclearelectrica signed a MOU with CGN to build the two reactors in a joint venture, 
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with the latter owning a majority stake.217 By then, all the Western companies had pulled out due 
to low profitability prospects in the project, leaving the Chinese corporation as the sole bidder for 
the public tender.218 In May 2019, after four years of negotiations between CGN and the GOR, 
both parties agreed to invest $8 billion in the construction of Cernavodă 3 and 4, another critical 
step in the selection process.219 However, as CGN neared completion of the deal, the Trump 
administration had other ideas.  
On August 14th, 2019, the Bureau of Industry and Security within the DOC added CGN to its 
Entity List, an indicator that no American company could sell technology to it.220 When Trump 
received Iohannis at the White House six days later, the two heads of state expressed in their 
joint statement the need to “urge our industries to work closely together to support Romania’s 
civil nuclear energy goals.”221 Allegations of espionage against the CGN resurfaced, such as the 
2016 case of a company engineer arrested for spying in the U.S.222 A month later, Prime Minister 
Viorica Dăncilă signed a MOU with U.S. Energy Secretary (SecEnergy) Rick Perry on civil 
nuclear cooperation.223 Although no specific project was mentioned within the agreement, 
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analysts believed that future collaboration with the United States would address the Cernavodă 
reactors.224 After the Dăncilă government fell to a parliamentary no-confidence vote several 
months later and the National Liberal Party (PNL) took over under Prime Minister Ludovic 
Orban, the GOR’s drift away from Chinese investment accelerated. Orban noted in a January 
2020 interview that, “It is clear to me that it will not work with the Chinese … We will see with 
which partner [the reactors will be built]. It is about partners and funding.”225 On a different 
occasion, Energy Minister Virgil Popescu added that entering a new venture on the Cernavodă 
units with a NATO ally would be more feasible.226 The final blow came on June 11th, 2020, 
when the Orban government requested Nuclearelectrica to terminate its agreement with CGN, 
thus creating an opportunity for the United States to enter into the fold.227  
The Trump administration did not take such an opening for granted, as during Popescu’s visit 
to Washington on October 9th the Romanian minister signed an agreement with SecEnergy Dan 
Brouillette securing U.S. financing for the Cernavodă reactors and support for expanding 
Romania’s civil nuclear power program.228 Brouillette claimed that “this agreement between the 
U.S. and Romania furthers our mutual energy cooperation and will strengthen the energy 
security of both our nations.”229 Popescu also signed a MOU with U.S. Export-Import Bank 
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President Kimberly Reed regarding the financing of other nuclear projects through Romania.230 
Reed followed up by visiting Bucharest in December, meeting with GOR officials to discuss the 
Cernavodă agreement, joint cooperation in civil nuclear matters, and furthering U.S. exports to 
Romania.231 Brussels looked favorably upon the U.S.-Romanian deal, as the European 
Commission approved the financing package which included French and Canadian partners 
along with American businesses in the new consortium.232 In signing the deal to construct the 
Cernavodă reactors, the Trump administration did more than just beat its geopolitical rival in 
Beijing – it furthered U.S. economic ties with the GOR that had been in place since the Clinton 
administration and the launch of the Strategic Partnership. In submitting the Romania-U.S. 
Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to Congress in 1999, Clinton wrote that, “I believe that 
peaceful nuclear cooperation with Romania under the proposed new agreement will be fully 
consistent with, and supportive of, our policy of responding positively and constructively to the 
process of democratization and economic reform in Central Europe. Cooperation under the 
agreement also will provide opportunities for U.S. business on terms that fully protect vital U.S. 
national security interests.”233 Due to the actions of officials throughout the DOC and DOE, the 
Trump administration was able to accomplish similar objectives by financing the Cernavodă deal 
while ousting a Chinese corporate rival. 
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Like CGN and the Cernavodă reactors, Huawei and its deal with the GOR fell under the 
Trump administration’s suspicion. Though Huawei’s presence in the Romanian market dates 
back to 2003, a significant event was the 2013 signing of an MOU by both the GOR and China’s 
telecommunications ministers, which allowed the company to develop Romania’s national 
information and communications systems.234 Huawei has since been active in the 5G rollout 
within various EU member states including Romania, despite accusations from Washington that 
the corporation has engaged in “stealing US technology, conspiracy wire fraud, bank fraud, [and] 
racketeering.”235 In May 2019, the Trump administration voiced its opposition to Huawei’s 
expansion among U.S. allies during a 5G security conference in Prague. Although the attendees, 
comprised of representatives from NATO and EU member states, did not target Huawei in their 
proposal, they noted that “the overall risk of influence on a supplier by a third country should be 
taken into account…All stakeholders including industry should work together to promote 
security and resilience of national critical infrastructure networks.”236 Washington and Brussels 
declared their position on the dangers of Huawei’s expansion, and the GOR proved to be one of 
the more receptive U.S. allies to that message. 
During Iohannis’ August 2019 visit to Washington, the Romanian and U.S. delegations 
signed a MOU establishing criteria that a 5G network provider would have to meet, such as 
whether it is state-owned and has a transparent ownership structure.237 Romania became the first 
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country to sign such a bilateral agreement, and states like Poland and Estonia followed in signing 
their respective instruments with the U.S on 5G security. A third condition, “whether the vendor 
has a history of ethical corporate behavior and is subject to a legal regime that enforces 
transparent corporate practices,” was intended to convey the GOR’s commitment to transatlantic 
values while excluding companies like Huawei which operate under Beijing’s autocratic rule.238 
The MOU was followed up with Trump and Iohannis’ joint statement, which declared “we also 
seek to avoid the security risks that accompany Chinese investment in 5G telecommunications 
networks.”239 After heavy lobbying from the Trump administration at the December 2019 NATO 
Summit in London, members included in the Summit Communiqué a clause stating that, “NATO 
and its Allies, within their respective authority, are committed to ensuring the security of our 
communications, including 5G, recognising the need to rely on secure and resilient systems.”240 
Tying concerns about Huawei’s involvement in 5G with Romania’s security after the summit, 
Iohannis said in an interview that, “We need to link the approach to 5G technology to the 
national security and NATO security.”241 The Romanian president followed up several months 
later during an April 2020 press conference, where he said, “…national security and national 
security provided together with the partner United States of America and NATO will be a 
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prevalent criterion.”242 With the public tender for Romania’s 5G network set to be held this year, 
the Trump administration’s rhetoric through USG agencies like the DOS grew more determined 
in the following months.  
“Huawei’s deals with telecommunications operators around the world are evaporating, 
because countries are only allowing trusted vendors in their 5G networks,” remarked Pompeo 
last June.243 On August 5th, the SecState announced the formation of the Clean Network – the 
Trump administration’s program to advance its stance against Huawei and other Chinese tech 
companies at home and abroad. On September 30th, both NATO and the EU announced their 
participation in the Clean Network, signaling the support of America’s allies toward the 
initiative.244 After the domestic legislation barring Huawei from developing the GOR’s 5G 
network was presented in August 2020, Amb. Zuckerman wrote in an op-ed that “Huawei and 
the Communist Chinese want to make Romania the surveillance state of 30 years ago- just like it 
is in Communist China. Send Beijing a message—the Communist surveillance state no longer 
exists in Romania.”245 Huawei sought recourse against the potential ban from the EU, penning a 
letter to EU competition chief Margrethe Vestager on how Romania and Poland’s bans on 
Huawei violate the EU’s open market policies.246 Orban did not seem convinced, as he claimed 
                                                          
242 “The Press Conference Held by the President of Romania, Mr. Klaus Iohannis.” Office of the Romanian 
President, April 28, 2020. https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/declaratii-de-presa/conferinta-de-presa-sustinuta-de-
presedintele-romaniei-domnul-klaus-iohannis1588095518.   
243 “The Tide Is Turning Toward Trusted 5G Vendors .” U.S. Department of State, June 24, 2020. https://2017-
2021.state.gov/the-tide-is-turning-toward-trusted-5g-vendors/index.html.   
244 “Building a Clean Network - Key Milestones.” U.S. Department of State, 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/12/ET_CN_Timeline.pdf.   
245 “Now More Than Ever Huawei Is the Wrong Way.” U.S. Embassy in Romania, September 10, 2020. 
https://ro.usembassy.gov/now-more-than-ever-huawei-is-the-wrong-way/.   
246 Cerulus, Laurens. “Huawei Challenges Legality of 5G Bans in Poland, Romania.” Politico, November 2, 2020. 
https://www.politico.eu/article/huawei-hints-at-legal-action-against-5g-bans-in-poland-romania/.   
  98  
 
in an interview last November that “with respect to 5G, [China] cannot be our partner.”247 With 
Huawei’s presence in Romania uncertain going forward, analysts noted how the Trump 
administration’s incorporating its geopolitical strategy of countering Beijing’s economic reach 
into U.S.-Romanian economic relations was a bellwether for developments elsewhere. “What 
happens in Romania will be a good guide to how U.S.-China competition will play out, from the 
U.K. to Poland and beyond,” wrote one journalist.248 
For Trump administration officials, countering Russia’s influence in the Black Sea region 
meant targeting CEE states’ dependence on Russian natural gas and energy reserves along with 
boosting development throughout the region in sectors like transport and cybersecurity. 
Infrastructure networks across former Eastern Bloc states like Romania are underdeveloped in 
comparison to other NATO and EU members. Romania’s post-2004 inclusion in the West has 
not brought substantial investment from Brussels in addressing the crumbling roads and bridges, 
even as NATO forces and weaponry have increasingly shifted to the eastern flank following 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea. A recent IMF report noted that overcoming the infrastructure gap 
between the CEE states and the top 15 EU economies would amount to spending $1.2 trillion 
over the next 10 years.249 Road and rail travel in the region takes on average about two to four 
times longer than comparable travel elsewhere in the EU.250 Meanwhile, Moscow holds leverage 
over the CEE states by providing for their energy needs and incomes as “transit” countries which 
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allow Russian gas to flow to Western Europe. While Romania has potential in exploring the vast 
oil reserves in the Black Sea, it still relies on oil delivered by Russia’s state-owned company 
Gazprom, with 2019 imports reaching 1.2 million tonnes.251 Thus, Moscow’s influence continues 
to be felt in exploiting NATO and by extension Romania’s vulnerabilities in energy security.  
In an effort to address these shortcomings while promoting bilateral economic ties with 
Romania, the Trump administration engaged with Bucharest primarily through multilateral CEE 
forums. Such bodies include the Bucharest Nine (B9), where leaders of the nine easternmost 
NATO states regularly meet to discuss common security issues in the region. The B9 ensures 
that attention is given toward implementing NATO initiatives related to developing “a coherent 
and integrated approach to the defense of the Eastern flank.” 252 Other groups, such as the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership (EaP), secure Romania’s participation in seeking cooperation with other non-
EU/NATO countries on their path to membership. Aside from promoting democracy and 
sectorial reforms, the EaP aims to spur economic and social development in countries from 
Belarus to Armenia, and the GOR’s participation is considered “a priority of Romanian foreign 
policy.”253 While the Trump administration supported both groups, it primarily interacted with 
the GOR on economic affairs through the 3SI – a body of 12 EU states from the Baltic, Adriatic, 
and Black Seas aimed at promoting energy, economic, and infrastructure development. Launched 
in 2015 by Polish President Andrzej Duda, the forum allows Bucharest to collaborate with other 
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CEE states on projects in technology, transport, and other industries.254 Romania’s Export-
Import Bank has participated in several infrastructure proposals, and private-public partnerships 
between CEE governments provide opportunities for dialogue.255 The Trump administration 
recognized the benefits of U.S. political and economic support for the initiative, since the region 
accounts for 30 per cent of the area of the EU, 22 per cent of its population but only 10% of its 
gross domestic product (which is projected to grow by 35 per cent by 2030).256 
By investing in the 3SI and its potential to develop Romania and other CEE states’ 
infrastructure and energy capacity, the Trump administration recognized that such matters affect 
Washington and Brussels’ military policy in the CEE as well. The 2016 NATO Summit in 
Warsaw saw member states elevate their civilian infrastructure to a tier on par with military 
infrastructure in strategic importance. However, officials believe that the alliance is unable to 
fulfill its mission of collective defense in an era of Russia’s hybrid warfare with the current, 
decrepit state of infrastructure on NATO’s eastern flank.257 Despite the presence of rapid-
response units like the NFIUs and VJTFs in both the Baltic and Black Sea regions, the loss of 
military mobility has hampered “NATO’s ability to reinforce threatened Allies rapidly and if 
necessary at large scale, which is an essential aspect of its deterrence posture in the Baltic region 
                                                          
254 Brânda, Oana Elena. "The Three Seas Initiative- a New Role for Romania?" Defense Resources Management in 
the 21st Century 13, no. 13 (2018): 83-89. 
255 Kochis, Daniel. “U.S. Contributions to 3 Seas Investment Fund Are Smart, Strategic.” The Heritage Foundation, 
January 5, 2021. https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/us-contributions-3-seas-investment-fund-are-
smart-strategic. 
256 How, Marcus. “The Region's Untapped Potential - Three Seas Initiative.” Visegrad Insight, December 7, 2020. 
https://visegradinsight.eu/region-untapped-potential-risks-three-seas-initiative/.   
257 Zulean, Marian. “NATO Must Tackle Eastern Europe's Defence Infrastructure Gap.” Balkan Insight, October 20, 
2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/10/20/nato-must-tackle-eastern-europes-defence-infrastructure-gap/.   
  101  
 
and elsewhere.”258 Former EUCOM and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Gen. Curtis 
Scaparrotti concurred, noting in an April 2020 Atlantic Council report that… 
Strong and enduring military mobility capabilities are even more essential for European 
defense and deterrence in the twenty-first century given NATO’s reliance on a rapid-
reinforcement strategy to defend its eastern flank…The transatlantic community will 
positively influence the calculations of Russia or any other adversary about Alliance 
capabilities and intentions by ensuring that its defense capabilities are mobile, rapid, and 
survivable, thus greatly reducing the likelihood of conflict. By strengthening force 
enablement and military mobility, Europe can bolster its security posture for decades to 
come, ensuring credible deterrence and defense for the long term…Much of the existing 
infrastructure in former Warsaw Pact states is largely unsuitable for modern NATO 
equipment, while administrative hurdles related to border crossings and a NATO command-
and-control system that was streamlined after the Cold War have invariably impacted the 
Alliance’s ability to move rapidly in a conflict. Force enablement and military mobility 
planning in Europe must be adapted accordingly to address these and other issues.259   
As for diversifying CEE states’ energy needs away from Russian sources, the 3SI has been 
considered as a primary mechanism through which NATO could invest in pipeline construction 
in areas like the Black Sea. Officials in Brussels have proposed extending the NATO Pipeline 
System (NPS) eastward to countries like Romania, which would diminish Russian control over 
energy distribution by allowing CEE states to access internal reserves throughout the 
continent.260 
When Trump attended the 2017 3SI Summit in Warsaw, he expressed his support for the 
initiative by saying, “We support your drive for greater prosperity and security. We applaud your 
initiative to expand infrastructure. We welcome this historic opportunity to deepen our economic 
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partnership with your region.”261 At the following year’s 3SI Summit in Bucharest, SecEnergy 
Perry delivered remarks on behalf of the Trump administration. Perry claimed that “We believe 
there is a great security in energy diversity, in a multiplicity of energy sources and types, and 
routes. This is why the United States supports the core principle of energy diversification as a 
key pillar of the 3 Seas Initiative, ultimately as a way to complete Europe.”262 He also unveiled 
the launch of the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation, which would focus on 
attracting capital from private investors for developing energy corridors in CEE states like 
Romania. Trump followed up with a personal message to the forum’s attendees, applauding “our 
shared focus on expanding infrastructure, enhancing business connections, strengthening energy 
security, and reducing barriers to free, fair, and reciprocal trade in Central and Eastern 
Europe.”263 The 3SI received another major boost as Pompeo pledged up to $1 billion from the 
U.S. International Development Finance Corporation for 3SI proposals at the February 2020 
Munich Security Conference.264 At the body’s Summit later that year, the USG also pledged to 
provide 30% of the combined contributions of 3SI states to the Three Seas Initiative Investment 
Fund (3SIIF).265 The Luxembourg-based 3SIIF will provide funding for the initiative’s 77 
project proposals, including a Danube-Oder-Elbe waterways project, a “Rail Baltica” high-speed 
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railway, and a “Via Carpathia” highway in the Balkans.266 With respect to Romania, the USG 
announced $7 billion towards constructing a North-South motorway and railway system 
connecting the major Polish port of Gdańsk to Constanța, a project that holds the potential of 
millions of dollars in increased trade while ensuring military mobility in the event of a Russian 
attack.267 
The Trump administration’s funding and support for 3SI projects was well-received both 
within CEE governments and domestic U.S. political circles. A November 2020 congressional 
resolution supporting the 3SI unanimously passed the House of Representatives, signifying “a 
key step to complete the vision of a Europe that is undivided, prosperous, secure, and free from 
Russian and Chinese malign influence.”268 The geopolitical implications of U.S. investment in 
the 3SI and infrastructure development in Romania are not only limited to containing Russian 
influence, but Chinese as well. Journalists have noted that the 3SI “allows the U.S. to strengthen 
transatlantic business, energy, and geopolitical ties to Central and Eastern Europe, while 
counterbalancing Chinese and Russian efforts to make regional inroads.”269 A May 2020 
Congressional Research Service report noted that the administration regards “U.S. involvement 
with the 3SI as a complement to the United States’ already extensive diplomatic, security, and 
economic cooperation with the countries of central and eastern Europe.”270 NATO Deputy 
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Secretary General Mircea Geoana has stressed that joint U.S.-Romanian involvement through the 
3SI symbolizes “a step forward both economically, as well as militarily and strategically for our 
region and for Romania.”271 Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, 
Energy, the Environment, former National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones stated that 
“Strategically, full implementation [of the Three Seas Initiative] will fortify the 
alliance`s eastern periphery and blunt Putin`s ability to wield energy as a weapon in the region. 
Operationally, modernized and integrated transportation corridors, energy linkages, and 
communications networks will directly benefit NATO`s capabilities.”272  With a bipartisan 
consensus on wielding supporting the 3SI as a counter to Chinese and Russian interests in the 
CEE, the Trump administration was able to also support bilateral economic ties with Romania.  
 The Trump administration’s impact on U.S.-Romanian economic ties and its implications on 
great power competition in the Black Sea region have had a lasting effect so far. Since Trump’s 
leaving office, the GOR has continued its stance against Beijing through actions like issuing a 
memorandum on February 4th blocking the awarding of public infrastructure contracts to 
companies that do not have a bilateral trade agreement with Brussels. GOR officials explained 
the reasoning behind the framework as to “exclude companies that do not live up to European 
standards,” effectively barring Chinese companies from participating in infrastructure projects.273 
The reluctance of the GOR to involve Chinese companies in economic development extended to 
Bucharest’s participation in the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European 
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Countries initiative (also known as the 17+1 format), a forum for CEE states in the BRI to 
discuss investment and trade. Romania opted to send ministers instead of its head of state along 
with five other NATO allies to the 2021 17+1 Summit despite Beijing’s insisting on high-level 
participation at the gathering.274 Commenting on the strengthening of U.S.-Romanian economic 
ties at the expense of Bucharest’s relations with China, Deputy Prime Minister Dan Barna said, 
“We are simply respecting the strategic choices we’ve made: our partnership with the U.S., 
NATO and EU membership.”275 Minister of Foreign Affairs Bogdan Aurescu echoed such 
sentiments in a recent op-ed, stating that Bucharest’s strategic decisions on Cernavodă and 
Huawei strengthen the “complex architecture of durable values contributing to Romania’s central 
pillars: EU membership, NATO participation and the strategic partnership with the USA.”276 
Meanwhile, U.S. engagement with Romania through the 3SI and its projects to boost 
infrastructure development hold the potential to challenge Russia’s energy leverage while 
improving military mobility in the Black Sea region. In Romania, the Trump administration 
ultimately found a reliable partner in its struggle against Beijing and Moscow. From the DOE’s 
measures on cooperation on civil nuclear use to the DOS’ support for 3SI, officials efficiently 
wielded bilateral economic ties with Romania into the Trump administration’s flexible response 
against adversaries in the Black Sea. 
 
                                                          
 274 Standish, Reid. “Chinese Summit Gets Chilly Reception From Central, Eastern European Countries.” 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, February 9, 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/chinese-summit-gets-chilly-reception-
from-central-eastern-european-countries/31094507.html.   
275 Michaels, Daniel, and Valentina Pop. “China Faces European Obstacles as Some Countries Heed U.S. Pressure.” 
The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-faces-european-obstacles-as-some-
countries-heed-u-s-pressure-11614088843.   
276 Albu-Comanescu, Radu. “Drawing a Defence Line in Europe's East - Romania.” Visegrad Insight, December 10, 
2020. https://visegradinsight.eu/romania-elections-drawing-a-defence-line-in-europes-east/.    
  106  
 
IV. Political Measures 
The preamble to NATO’s 1949 Washington Treaty states that the parties to the instrument 
agree to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on 
the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”277 Romania, in the 30 years 
since its break from communist rule and 17 years as a NATO member, has struggled to 
consistently meet such standards. Backsliding on adherence to these values has been symbolized 
in rising levels of corruption while efforts to combat graft have been deprioritized. Bucharest has 
often been condemned for its unwillingness to uphold the rule of law by Brussels, where officials 
have placed it in the same category as other members who detract from EU standards like Poland 
and Hungary.278 In the midst of such domestic turmoil, the Trump administration sought 
common ground with Bucharest in political affairs while upholding principles such as democracy 
and human rights. The administration acknowledged that as a fellow member of NATO and 
signatory to the Strategic Partnership, the United States has an interest in supporting political 
stability in Romania. This is especially true considering that U.S. military and economic policies 
within Romania hinge on the functioning of its democracy and its firm footing in the West. Thus, 
agencies like the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DHS furthered joint anti-terrorism and anti-
crime efforts with their Romanian counterparts, while the DOS acted as a monitor on a number 
of internal Romanian issues like human rights. Through such measures, the administration 
upheld previous U.S. efforts to uphold Romania’s democratic institutions while bolstering 
political ties by cooperating in other mutual areas of interest like law enforcement.  
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In 2020, Romania ranked 69th in the world on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, compared to 59th in 2017.279 Corruption has been a persistent problem not 
only for Romania’s political system, but also for its economic potential, as investors shy away 
from the unwelcoming business climate.280 Political instability and partisan gridlock in Bucharest 
frequently hampers attempts for internal reform, as parties like PSD have become the sponsors of 
legislation to weaken anti-corruption mechanisms while the center-right PNL and other groups 
have opposed such measures. After PSD won the 2016 elections on its populist platform, party 
leaders like Liviu Dragnea, who became the President of the Chamber of Deputies, held sway 
over the passing of legislation. Although Dragnea was barred from becoming Prime Minister due 
to charges of electoral fraud and corruption, he was nevertheless able to influence PSD policies 
on public institutions like the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA). The DNA was 
established in 2005, but its cases against Romanian officials accelerated under the leadership of 
Chief Prosecutor Laura Codruța Kövesi beginning in 2013. In 2014 alone, the DNA indicted 
dozens of mayors, five MPs, two ex-ministers, and a former prime minister.281  
Although the DNA proved to be effective in prosecuting government officials for their 
crimes, the PSD-led government pushed through a series of laws breaking down judicial 
independence and reforming charges like corruption and bribery. The first was in early 2017, 
when an emergency decree was signed decriminalizing abuse in office by officials, halting all 
pending corruption charges, freeing officials already charged, and blocking future investigations 
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into such charges.282 The measure, seen as a way for individuals like Dragnea to stand for higher 
office following the dropping of criminal charges, was swiftly condemned by the international 
community. Subsequent measures introduced throughout 2017 and 2018 intended to hinder the 
DNA’s work and fire Kövesi as its head, hamper anti-corruption policies, and decriminalize 
corruption.283 Dragnea and other PSD activists decried the presence of a “parallel state” - one 
which purposefully targets government officials.284 Thus, the GOR created a “Section for the 
Investigation of Offences in the Judiciary” to prosecute criminal offenses committed by 
magistrates – an office through which the government harassed and questioned Kövesi as a 
suspect in two phony cases related to alleged false testimony.285 Although President Iohannis 
initially refused to fire Kövesi as required by law, a decisions by the Romanian Constitutional 
Court ultimately forced him to do so. By 2019, Brussels threatened Bucharest with Article 7 
disciplinary proceedings for the GOR’s illiberal policies regarding the rule of law and judiciary 
independence.286 In summarizing Brussels’ discontent with the GOR, the Council of Europe’s 
Group of States against Corruption condemned the PSD’s “passing criminal law amendments 
which would contradict its international commitments and undermine its domestic capacities in 
the area of the fight against corruption.”287 
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The PSD’s overhaul of the Romanian legal system led to frustration and anger among the 
Romanian public. A pervasive lack of confidence in public institutions and the GOR’s 
determination to fight graft has led to consistent mass protests throughout Romania since 2017. 
The recurrent anti-government demonstrations protesting PSD proposals have been met with 
police violence and mass arrests on a scale not seen since the early 1990s. Protests throughout 
2017 saw hundreds of thousands of Romanians peacefully demonstrate across the country 
against the government ordinances and demand change (the popular outcry resulted in the 
ousting of two PSD Prime Ministers before Dăncilă’s taking power in January 2018)288. The next 
round of protests occurred on August 10th of that year to demand the resignation of the Dăncilă 
government. However, this time the Romanian police responded forcefully by using tear gas, 
pepper spray, and water cannons on demonstrators in Bucharest.289 Bystanders, including foreign 
journalists covering the protests, were beaten by police, resulting in over 400 injuries.290 Brussels 
joined other states across Europe in condemning the GOR’s sanctioning of police violence, while 
Amnesty International released a statement calling for the “prompt, thorough, independent and 
impartial investigations by civilian authorities into the allegations of unnecessary and excessive 
use of force.”291 The coverage of the August 2018 protests shed a light on the PSD’s brutal 
crackdown even as the government continued to target anti-corruption efforts.  
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The PSD’s politically-unpopular position allowed Iohannis, a PNL member who has spoken 
out against the reforms on numerous occasions, to coast to a resounding reelection in November 
2019, beating Dăncilă 63 to 37 percent.292 By then, the Dăncilă government had been toppled by 
a no-confidence vote in Parliament and Iohannis had designated PNL member Ludovic Orban as 
Prime Minister.293 Even before Dăncilă’s ouster and subsequent loss to Iohannis, PSD suffered a 
double-blow that May: heavy losses at the European Parliament elections and the jailing of 
Dragnea on corruption charges.294 Along with Dragnea’s sentencing and the steady decline of 
popular support for the PSD, another highlight has been Kövesi’s appointment as Brussels’ first 
European Chief Prosecutor despite PSD attempts to sabotage her candidacy.295 Political 
instability nevertheless remains an issue in Romania, as the consistent parliamentary gridlock has 
paralyzed efforts to undo the damage caused by PSD policies. The Orban government had only 
been in power a little over three months before it fell to a PSD-led no-confidence vote on 
February 5th, 2020.296  Despite Parliament’s acceptance of a second Orban government in the 
midst of a state of emergency due to the COVID-19 spread, he resigned from office last 
December after PNL’s poor showing during the legislative elections.297 Political parties’ 
reluctance to work with another PSD government allowed the PNL to form a minority 
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government with former Finance Minister Florin Cîțu at the helm as the new Prime Minister.298 
Plenty of work remains to be done to undo the damage caused by PSD policies before real 
progress can be made in Romania’s anti-corruption fight. 
Throughout the period of political turmoil within Romania over the past several years, the 
Trump administration has sustained the U.S. policy in upholding the resiliency of Romania’s 
institutions and ensuring its adherence to NATO principles. The annual DOS Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP) Report has helped shine a light on the shortcomings of Romania’s law 
enforcement and its efforts to combat human trafficking. Romania has consistently ranked as 
having one of the largest number of registered victims of human trafficking according to a recent 
European Commission report, which also claimed that “the number of Romanian children 
registered as victims of trafficking in the EU-28 for 2017-2018 was nearly 10 times higher than 
for 2015-2016.”299 Likewise, the TIP reports spared no criticism of the GOR for its lack of effort 
and investment in countering trafficking, with the most recent release noting that “authorities did 
not adequately screen for trafficking indicators or identify victims among vulnerable populations, 
such as asylum-seekers, individuals in commercial sex, or children in government-run 
institutions.”300 This has led Romania to remain on DOS’ Tier 2 watch-list for two consecutive 
years, the only EU country with such a designation except for Ireland.301 The previous year’s TIP 
report observed that “failure to prioritize trafficking, widespread corruption, and sweeping legal 
                                                          
298 Ghirda, Vadim. “Former Banker Named PM-Designate after Romania Election.” Associated Press, December 22, 
2020. https://apnews.com/article/health-romania-coronavirus-pandemic-klaus-iohannis-economy-
7d6b66f0ff1d3a0bdb7526a06b3e6d74.   
299 “Data Collection on Trafficking in Human Beings in the EU.” European Commission, September 2020. 
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/study_on_data_collection_on_trafficking_in_human_beings_in_the_eu.pdf?fbcl
id=IwAR0mrmmHHI0EE1WvWXhsqwS0ItGGWCTz-ia0bamDRPfR4D_n_12KSYYvx90.   
300 “2020 Trafficking in Persons Report for Romania.” U.S. Embassy in Romania, June 26, 2020. 
https://ro.usembassy.gov/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report-for-romania/.   
301 “U.S. State Department: Human Trafficking, Still a Major Problem in Romania.” Romania Insider, June 26, 
2020. https://www.romania-insider.com/human-trafficking-report-romania-2020.   
  112  
 
and judicial reforms hampered effective law enforcement.”302 The TIP report itself is a 
component of the DOS’ Country Report on Human Rights Practices, which details Romania’s 
record on Western standards ranging from respect for civil liberties and protection of refugees to 
the treatment of national minorities and worker rights.303 The Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices allows the USG to note Bucharest’s areas of improvement with respect to its domestic 
policies, with versions such as the 2017 report noting that the “most significant human rights 
issues include endemic official corruption, police violence against the Roma community, and 
violence against LGBTI persons.”304 
The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest has consistently released statements calling on the GOR to 
avoid blocking anti-corruption efforts and weakening the rule of law, which “can only undermine 
Romania’s standing in the international community and risks damaging partnerships that are 
based on common values, inherent in the guiding principles of the EU and NATO.”305 Embassy 
visits by DOS officials like Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Hale underscored the 
administration’s attempts to persuade Bucharest to “reject any proposals for amnesty or any 
other measures that would endanger the tremendous progress made during the past 30 years 
toward greater security, prosperity and democracy.”306 Upon the release of the 2020 TIP Report, 
Amb. Zuckerman launched a joint “zero-tolerance human trafficking program” and pledged U.S. 
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law enforcement resources to fight the rise in such crimes.307 Zuckerman’s predecessor as U.S. 
Ambassador to Romania, Hans Klemm, spoke out against the GOR’s efforts to weaken the 
judiciary during an event in 2018, noting how the reforms will result in “less accountability, 
more criminality, and less international cooperation in the fight against global threats to our 
society and national security such as: cybercrime, human trafficking, corruption, money 
laundering, and terrorism.”308 Pompeo reinforced the embassy’s messaging by telling Romanian 
Foreign Minister Teodor Meleșcanu at the April 2019 NATO Ministerial that local corruption 
was undermining democratic institutions and thus promoting Russian malign influence.309 With 
the DOS’ public outreach from its embassy in Bucharest and Washington along with its reports 
on Romanian domestic affairs, the Trump administration identified aspects of the GOR’s policies 
that do not conform to the transatlantic values Romania has bound to uphold as a member of 
NATO. Thus, Washington was able to encourage internal reform and sought increased political 
cooperation with Bucharest to address such matters.  
For the first half of 2019, Romania held the seat of the EU Council Presidency for the first 
time since joining the body, allowing Bucharest to showcase its leadership in addressing 
continental issues. One particular event highlighted Romania’s efforts to further cooperation with 
the Trump administration on political matters – the EU-U.S. Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministerial. Attorney General William Barr and Acting Deputy Secretary for Homeland Security 
David Pekoske represented the joint DOJ/DHS delegation on behalf of the Trump administration 
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while the Romanian team consisted of Minister of Justice Ana Birchall and Minister of the 
Interior Carmen Dan. The meeting addressed joint measures by Brussels and Washington to 
combat transnational crime and advance counterterrorism goals through information sharing. In 
bilateral meetings with GOR officials from Iohannis to Dăncilă, Barr hailed joint U.S.-Romanian 
measures which investigate and extradite... 
members of organized criminal groups engaging in worldwide skimming and cyber-enabled 
fraud operations. Romania also provides critical support to DEA on counternarcotics 
operations. Our partnership has historically been rooted in a deep commitment to the 
democratic values of the rule of law and good governance, and a shared understanding that 
these form the foundation for increasing our shared security and prosperity.310 
U.S. law enforcement agencies have increased their work with Romanian institutions in 
tackling transnational crime, especially in the wake of the TIP reports noting Romania’s need to 
further develop its anti-trafficking capabilities. The DOJ’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development, 
Assistance, and Training program also assists Romanian efforts to combat corruption and 
organized crime.311 The Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) work with Romanian drug control 
groups has led to successful joint missions, including the recent seizure of a $94.2 million 
shipment of illegal narcotics from Syria in Constanța.312 On October 29th, 2020, the USG 
announced a grant of $600,000 to the International Justice Mission to combat human trafficking 
in countries like Romania, which Zuckerman announced would “help Romania track down and 
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bring to justice those who exploit their fellow human beings.”313 Coordination between the DOJ, 
DHS, and the GOR also led to the extradition of two Romanians linked to an international 
human trafficking ring on August 14th, 2020.314 The work of such agencies demonstrated the 
Trump administration’s resolve in continuing U.S. support for strengthening Romania’s law 
enforcement capabilities.  
Having another nation-state as an ally means working together to achieve common goals in 
securing both internal and external stability. While the United States has worked with the GOR 
to advance Romania’s military and economic potential since 1989, its policy in backing the 
gradual development of Romania’s democracy and judicial institutions has proven to be just as 
important. Bilateral political ties with a country which continues to struggle with tackling issues 
like corruption and trafficking are a work in progress. The first several years following the 
Romanian revolution saw police violence against anti-government protestors, human rights 
violations against ethnic minorities, and public sector graft. At the time, the elder Bush 
administration took a firm stance against Bucharest’s actions, noting that such developments 
were not favorable for a country which sees itself in the West. Over the past several years, the 
Trump administration has taken a similar stance, taking the GOR to task for its backsliding on 
the rule of law, judiciary independence, and anti-corruption efforts. Through its numerous 
reports on the impact of Romania’s domestic policies, DOS has monitored Bucharest’s 
adherence to transatlantic values such as human rights and democracy. The administration’s 
critical perspectives have not precluded U.S. officials from collaborating with their Romanian 
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counterparts in addressing mutual interests like countering transnational crime, which the DOJ 
and DHS have advanced through joint operations.  
It is important to note that U.S.-Romanian political relations under the Trump administration 
were a two-way street. Just as the DOS condemned the PSD government’s violent response 
against the 2017 protests as an attack on “strong judicial institutions shielded from political 
interference,” the Romanian Foreign Ministry voiced similar concerns after the January 6th, 2020 
insurrection at the U.S. Capitol.315 Romanian officials expressed worries over the attacks on U.S. 
public institutions and their hope that the U.S. will continue to set an example for other states 
through its resilient democracy. Deputy Prime Minister Dan Barna echoed the sentiments of 
many Romanians that day when he wrote how the “fact that we now see in the America of our 
dreams images similar to our memories of Romania 30 years ago is the most eloquent proof that 
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At a 2017 event celebrating 20 years since the launch of the U.S.-Romanian Strategic 
Partnership, Amb. Klemm remarked, “For two decades, the United States and Romania have 
collaborated closely on building a framework aimed at strengthening bilateral relations, 
supporting Romania’s democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration, fostering shared 
prosperity, and facing regional and global challenges.”317 Throughout its four years in office, the 
Trump administration sought to build upon the work of its predecessors in furthering such  
collaboration on matters of mutual interest. Despite initial concerns among Romanian officials 
that the Trump White House would either ignore or revert bilateral relations under the banner of 
its quasi-isolationist “America First” policy, the United States under the 45th President doubled-
down on its investment in Bucharest as a dependable ally. Trump continued the progress of 
previous U.S. administrations in furthering U.S. military, political, and economic ties with 
Bucharest while ensuring a U.S. strategic presence in the Black Sea region. His administration 
furthered American military and economic engagement with Romania as per the Strategic 
Partnership launched in 1997 while keeping Bucharest honest about its policies related to 
addressing corruption and human trafficking. The advancement of Washington and Bucharest’s 
ties was part of the administration’s broader “flexible response” to the challenges Russia and 
China posed to U.S. global leadership. Under Trump, the United States engaged with Romania to 
deter Moscow and Beijing’s influence in the Black Sea through a combination of American 
military might, diplomatic support, and economic investment. The strategy reflected U.S. actions 
with its allies against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, when the Kennedy administration 
enforced the original “flexible response.” U.S. relations with Romania were crafted primarily by 
administration officials, under whose stewardship agencies throughout the USG apparatus from 
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the Pentagon to DOE advanced U.S. strategic interests in Romania by ensuring Washington’s 
increased investment in the Black Sea littoral state.  
Prior to Trump’s election, U.S.-Romanian relations had undergone a remarkable 
transformation since Romania’s break with communist rule in 1989. Upon the violent overthrow 
of the Ceaușescu regime and the arrival of his apparatchiks to power, the USG under George 
H.W. Bush was determined to transition Romania away from its past as a member of the Eastern 
Bloc toward a more stable and prosperous future in the West. The journey would not be easy for 
Bucharest however, as internal troubles in the first several years ranged from the struggle to 
build public institutions anew in the face of cronyism, political protest with police violence, and 
interethnic clashes. In working with the Iliescu government to support Romania’s nascent 
democracy and its initial steps toward membership in the EU and NATO, the elder Bush’s 
administration ensured Washington’s commitment to see Romania anchored in the West. Clinton 
encouraged the development and modernization of the Romanian armed forces as a part of the 
GOR’s bid to join NATO while recognizing the potential for increased U.S. engagement with 
Romania in the launch of the Strategic Partnership. It was the younger Bush who formally 
welcomed Romania into the alliance and solidified its strategic importance in joint efforts like 
the GWOT, with Bucharest’s signing bilateral agreements providing for an American military 
presence on Romanian soil.  
With the Bush administration’s backing, Romania’s membership in NATO since 2004 
has allowed the GOR to pursue its national security objectives in the Black Sea, an increasingly 
dynamic region which saw a resurgent Russia launch its revanchist agenda with the Russo-
Georgian War of 2008. By recognizing the hostile intentions of the Kremlin along with other 
CEE states which comprise NATO’s eastern flank, Romania was able to position itself as a 
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crucial component of the Obama administration’s blueprint for European BMD. The construction 
and activation of the Aegis Ashore system at Deveselu provides both Brussels and Washington 
an effective deterrent against threats originating outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. Romania’s 
hosting of the site as part of the 2011 agreement marked a watershed moment for Romania’s 
post-1989 efforts to become a security provider in the Black Sea. Progress in bilateral economic 
relations during each administration focused on increasing U.S. corporations’ access to 
Romanian markets while assisting the GOR’s efforts to reform its centrally-planned economy. 
Although issues ranging from corruption to human trafficking have continued to plague 
Bucharest over the past 30 years, each U.S. administration has devoted the energy and efforts of 
law enforcement and related government agencies in assisting Romania to counter such 
developments.  
The past four years have seen the Trump administration incorporate U.S.-Romanian 
relations as a part of its strategy to address Moscow and Beijing’s threat to American influence 
both in the Black Sea region and throughout the world. Over the past several years, the Russians 
have built up the strength of their BSF, infringed upon Ukraine’s territoriality, and exploited the 
illegal annexation of Crimea to expand their influence in the Black Sea. To further modernize 
Romania’s armed forces and provide a resourceful deterrent to Moscow’s reach, the Trump 
administration delivered advanced technology to the GOR through its “Buy American” plan: 
PATRIOT missile systems, HIMARS batteries, and NSM radar systems, among others. U.S. 
military posture was reinforced with the deployment of MQ-9 Reaper drones to Câmpia Turzii 
base. The administration’s determination to resist Chinese economic expansion through Beijing’s 
deals with CEE states like Romania led USG officials to engage with Bucharest and offer 
Western alternatives. As a result, the Trump administration negotiated the construction of the 
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Cernavodă nuclear reactors and assured the exclusion of Chinese companies like Huawei from 
participating in Bucharest’s 5G network. The 3SI also has proven to be a useful body for 
Washington to invest in infrastructure development throughout Eastern Europe as an alternative 
to China’s BRI and Russia’s energy sources. Throughout each endeavor, Bucharest has been 
eager to work with Washington and align itself according to the three pillars of its foreign policy: 
NATO, the EU, and the Strategic Partnership with the United States.  
 After four years of the Trump administration’s “flexible response” in its ties with 
Bucharest, the Biden administration faces a critical test with respect to the future of U.S.-
Romanian bilateral relations. As a candidate during the 2020 presidential election, Biden wrote 
that “as a nation, we have to prove to the world that the United States is prepared to lead again—
not just with the example of our power but also with the power of our example…the United 
States will prioritize results by galvanizing significant new country commitments in three areas: 
fighting corruption, defending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights in their own 
nations and abroad.”318 The reorientation of American foreign policy along such guidelines will 
allow agencies like the DOS to further Washington’s objectives by pushing the GOR to 
internally reform and do more to address such issues. The Biden administration’s values-based 
approach can spotlight any further backsliding on Bucharest’s part, especially with the sudden 
rise of illiberal, nationalist parties like the Alliance for Romanian Unity, which currently sits in 
Parliament following their surprising performance at the 2020 elections.319 As for Trump-era 
measures intended to strengthen military-to-military relationships with Bucharest like the 
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purchase of F-16 upgrades, the DOS has paused the deal pending review and approval.320 The 
Pentagon under SecDef Lloyd Austin has also ordered a freeze on the Trump administration’s 
decision to withdraw troops from Germany.321 Although the freeze is part of a “global force 
posture review,” the move signals Biden’s hope to mend ties with Berlin after Trump’s tenuous 
relations with Germany while expressing the White House’s preference to shift gears away from 
the CEE to Western Europe. 
The latter development has left analysts to question the Biden administration’s 
committing the United States to safeguarding the security of the Black Sea in the midst of 
numerous security threats. Former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Gen. Phillip 
Breedlove has written extensively in recent months on the need for President Biden to continue 
the Trump administration’s work in advancing the U.S. presence throughout the Black Sea. 
Breedlove claims that “the Black Sea needs three things from the U.S.: strategic leadership, 
continued military support, and focused infrastructure development.”322 Others have urged the 
administration to consider uniting the alliance’s eFP in the Baltics and tFP in the Black Sea 
under one command as the Single Forward Presence (sFP). The sFP would allow NATO to better 
resist Moscow’s cyber and hybrid warfare tactics by furthering the CEE states’ resiliency and 
institutional defense capacities.323 The Black Sea remains a dynamic area with a fluid security 
environment and its importance in the global geostrategic rivalry with Russia and China 
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necessitates a continued U.S. presence.324 So far, the Biden administration has grasped the value 
of “showing the flag” in the area, as three U.S. warships conducted routine FONOPS this past 
February in what amounted to be the largest U.S. Navy presence in the Black Sea in three 
years.325 Russia responded by ordering a fighter jet to graze one of the vessels, the USS Donald 
Cook, as it has done in the past to test a new administration’s resolve.326 Continued U.S. support 
of multilateral economic and political-military bodies which Romania is a member of is just as 
important as dedicating resources to maintaining America’s presence in the Black Sea.  
Over a year since Pompeo’s $1 billion pledge to the 3SI, how will the Biden 
administration support a growing multilateral body seeking to bridge the CEE’s infrastructure 
gap with the rest of the EU? Bucharest and Warsaw have emerged as the leading voices 
encouraging and funding projects related to transport development, energy independence, and 
cyber security. U.S. political and economic assistance will further such efforts in the long-term 
and can spur private sector involvement from American corporations seeking a foothold in the 
region. The initiative has bipartisan support in Congress and is an effective means to further 
cohesion among CEE states against Russia while providing an alternative to China’s BRI and 
17+1 format. Ultimately, the more the Biden administration invests in furthering Romania and 
other CEE states’ development in relation to the rest of the EU, the firmer their anchoring in the 
West will be. As for engagement within NATO, the Biden administration has furthered USG 
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calls for increased burden-sharing among member states.327 During his March visit to Brussels, 
SecState Anthony Blinken claimed that, “We can’t build a foreign policy that delivers for the 
American people without maintaining effective alliances, and we can’t sustain effective alliances 
without showing how they deliver for the American people.”328 Biden already affirmed the 
United States’ commitment to Article V to Stoltenberg and stressed “the importance of shared 
values, consultation, and capabilities to strengthen deterrence and counter new and emerging 
threats.”329 Ultimately, Washington must continue to engage both the 3SI and NATO to fulfill its 
objectives in the arena of great power competition with America’s adversaries.  
 While President Biden promised during his campaign to depart from various aspects of 
Trump’s domestic and foreign policies, one thing both administrations can agree on is the return 
of great power competition and its implications for the United States. Trump and his advisors 
articulated their vision for the United States in the midst of Beijing and Russia’s subversion of 
international law, military adventurism, and economic intimidation in its national security 
documents. The Biden administration echoed similar views in its March 2021 U.S. Interim 
National Security Strategic Guidance, which claims that… 
The United States must renew its enduring advantages so that we can meet today’s 
challenges from a position of strength. We will build back better our economic 
foundations; reclaim our place in international institutions; lift up our values at home and 
speak out to defend them around the world; modernize our military capabilities, while 
leading first with diplomacy; and revitalize America’s unmatched network of alliances 
and partnerships…We must also contend with the reality that the distribution of power 
across the world is changing, creating new threats. China, in particular, has rapidly 
become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its 
                                                          
327 Blankenship, Brian. “Analysis | Biden Wants to Reassure Allies That the U.S. Is Still Interested in Their 
Security.” The Washington Post, March 4, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/04/biden-wants-
reassure-allies-that-us-is-still-interested-their-security/.   
328 Erlanger, Steven. “Blinken's Welcome by NATO Doesn't Hide Differences on Key Issues.” The New York Times, 
March 24, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/24/world/europe/Blinken-Biden-NATO-Europe.html.   
329 Kheel, Rebecca. “Biden Pledges US Commitment to Collective Defense in Call with NATO Head.” The Hill, 
January 26, 2021. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/535939-biden-pledges-us-commitment-to-collective-defense-in-
call-with-nato-head.   
  125  
 
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge 
to a stable and open international system. Russia remains determined to enhance its 
global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage. Both Beijing and Moscow 
have invested heavily in efforts meant to check U.S. strengths and prevent us from 
defending our interests and allies around the world.330 
Analysts agree that the administration will expand and develop America’s capabilities in 
the context of great power competition, ensuring that “geopolitics will not go away under the 
new administration.”331 In its first few months in office, the Biden administration has not 
hesitated to call Russia out on matters like the SolarWinds hack, the jailing of political dissident 
Alexei Navalny, and construction of the Nord Stream II pipeline. After a contentious bilateral 
meeting between U.S. officials and Chinese diplomats in Alaska in March 2021, members of the 
administration including Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan have indicated 
that they will continue to highlight Chinese human rights abuses in Xinjiang, condemn Beijing’s 
practice of intellectual property theft and cyberattacks, and denounce Chinese aggression in the 
South China Sea.332 In an effort to accentuate the contrast between Russia and China’s 
totalitarian partners around the globe and American leadership, the Biden administration will 
convene a “Summit of Democracies.”333 However, the administration’s emphasis on great power 
competition has not precluded it from seeking cooperation with rivals in areas of mutual concern. 
On February 3rd, 2021, the State Department announced the extension of the U.S.-Russia New 
START Treaty, one of the few nonproliferation instruments between the two nations, for five 
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years.334 USG officials have tried to engage with their Chinese counterparts on working toward 
progress on matters such as climate change and health security in the wake of COVID-19 
vaccination efforts.335 Despite the Biden administration’s attempts to advance a dialogue with 
Russia and China on several issues, it acknowledges that it is engaged in a global rivalry with 
both states and that a Trump-like “flexible response” is needed to advance American interests.   
During Iohannis’ visit to the White House in August 2019, Trump presented him with a 
“Make Romania Great Again” hat, a spin on the 45th President’s campaign slogan.336 In the face 
of Russian security threats in the Black Sea and China’s economic expansion in the region, the 
Trump administration sought to do just that: ensure a safe and prosperous future for Romania 
while advancing U.S. interests by strengthening military, political, and economic ties with 
Bucharest. As scholars begin to analyze and debate the implications of the Trump 
administration’s foreign policy, let them look to U.S.-Romania relations as a case study of how 
the administration supported a reliable, pro-Western ally in an era of global competition between 
the great powers.  
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